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I.   INTRODUCTION 
A growing national debate about the future of race, housing, 
and urban policy in the United States is reflected in the recent 
controversy over the administration of the Low-Income Housing Tax 
Credit1 (“LIHTC”) program, the largest federal program that supports 
building low-income housing.2  Administered by the Treasury 
Department, the program allows investors in residential rental 
property to claim tax credits for the development or rehabilitation of 
property to be rented to low-income tenants.3  The program is 
implemented mainly through state agencies which distribute the 
credit to developers on a competitive basis.4  Part of the LIHTC 
statute, which passed without debate as a later amendment, gives 
preference in allotting credits to very poor areas.5  Consistent with a 
common interpretation of this preference, many state agencies have 
allocated significant numbers of credits to areas with high 
concentrations of minorities and people with low incomes.6 
The concentration of low-income housing in already racially 
segregated neighborhoods, however, arguably violates the Federal 
Fair Housing Act of 1968 (“FHA”).7  The FHA responded to the 
government agencies’ tendency to impede integration by building low-
income housing in poor, segregated neighborhoods.  The legislative 
debate and the judicial and regulatory interpretation of the duty to 
affirmatively further fair housing reflect the understanding that such 
 
 1. 26 U.S.C. § 42 (2005). 
 2. Florence Wagman Roisman, Mandates Unsatisfied: The Low Income Housing Tax Credit 
Program and the Civil Rights Law, 52 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1011, 1011-12 (1998); see also Jill 
Khadduri et al., LIHTC and Mixed Income Housing: Enabling Families with Children to Live in 
Low-Income Housing, Address at the Association of Public Policy and Management Conference 1 
(Oct. 30, 2004), http://www.appam.org/conferences/fall/atlanta2004/sessions/downloads/3401.pdf 
(estimating that the number of LIHTC units is comparable to the number of public housing 
units). 
 3. See infra Part IV.B (discussing how the LIHTC works). 
 4. Id. 
 5. 26 U.S.C. §§ 42(d)(5)(C)(ii)(I), (m)(1)(B) (2005). 
 6. See infra Part IV.C (discussing data that experts have gathered on the LIHTC). 
 7. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3608(d)-(e) (2005). 
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building patterns fostered racial and social segregation.8  The Act 
ordered the federal government and all agencies and grantees 
involved in federally funded housing to “affirmatively further” fair 
housing.9  Courts and agency regulations interpreted this duty to 
require the federal government to use its programmatic leverage to 
support racial integration and to prohibit, with narrowly defined 
exceptions, the federal government and its grantees from developing 
low-income housing projects in areas where minority and low-income 
residents were concentrated.10 
Reconciliation of the tax credit’s preference and fair housing 
duties has received some attention among housing activists and 
scholars.11  The government agencies responsible for fair housing and 
for administering the programs, however, have not provided specific 
regulatory guidance.12  In 2003, a broad pre-litigation letter was sent 
by eleven state and national fair housing groups to the IRS 
administrator of the LIHTC program,13 and meetings related to this 
issue are beginning within the agencies.  Lawsuits have been filed in 
New Jersey and Connecticut14 and are being considered in 
Massachusetts.15 
After analyzing the national doctrinal issue, this Article uses 
as a case study the New Jersey case, In re Adoption of the 2003 Low 
 
 8. See infra Part III.B-C (discussing the legislative history and judicial interpretation of 
the Fair Housing Act’s requirement to “affirmatively further” the Act’s goals). 
 9. Id. 
 10. See infra Part III.C (discussing the judicial interpretation of the “affirmatively further” 
requirement). 
 11. E.g., Jim Schaafsma, Focus on the Low Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) Program, 
MPLP NEWSL. (Mich. Poverty L. Program), Winter 2003, available at  http://www.mplp.org/ 
materials/Newsletter/03Winter/housing1.htm (citing Roisman, supra note 2, who revealed the 
extent of the problem to the broader legal and civil rights community and energized reform 
efforts from outside civil rights organizations). 
 12. See Memorandum of Understanding among the Department of the Treasury, the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development, and the Department of Justice (August 11, 
2000), http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/housing/mou.htm (noting that the Secretaries agreed to “promote 
enhanced compliance with the Fair Housing Act . . . for the benefit of low-income housing tax 
credit properties and the general public.”). 
 13. Letter from Judith Liben, Staff Attorney, Massachusetts Law Reform Institute, et al. to 
Grace Robertson, Internal Revenue Service (March 30, 2004), http://www.prrac.org/pdf/ 
IRSLetter.pdf. 
 14. Asylum Hill Problem Solving Revitalization Ass’n v. King, No. (X02)CV030179515S, 
2004 Conn. Super. LEXIS 27 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 5, 2004). 
 15. See Letter from Judith Liben, Staff Attorney, Massachusetts Law Reform Institute, et 
al. to Jane Grumble, Director of Department of Housing and Community Development, and 
Catherine Racer, Associate Director for Housing Development, Department of Housing and 
Community Development 12-13 (Jan. 7, 2004), http://www.prrac.org/pdf/MA2004LawReform.pdf 
(opposing current LIHTC fair housing compliance guidelines). 
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Income Housing Tax Credit Qualified Allocation Plan (“In re 2003”).16  
In this case, the plaintiffs and civil rights and community 
organizations argued that the state housing finance agency violated 
its fair housing duty by allocating most credits for family housing in 
poor, segregated neighborhoods,.17  The state agency argued that, 
while segregation might be harmful, the fair housing duty does not 
apply to the LIHTC program and that proposed race conscious 
remedies are unconstitutional.18  The New Jersey Superior Court 
found the FHA duty to “affirmative[ly] further” fair housing to be 
applicable, but held that the state agency’s plan, in part because of the 
statutory preference for LIHTC in low-income neighborhoods, did not 
violate that duty.19 
The positions of the parties in the New Jersey case reflect 
broad differences between fair housing advocates and regionalists on 
one side and localist20 practitioners of community development and 
urban political leaders on the other.21  Civil rights and regionalist22 
advocates argue that concentrating federal and state-funded low-
income housing in poor, segregated, and resegregating neighborhoods 
has contributed substantially to racial segregation and concentrated 
poverty.  Regional racial segregation and housing discrimination, they 
argue, hurts both poor and middle-class blacks and Latinos by 
destroying job opportunities and dramatically worsening living 
conditions in central cities and older suburbs.23  While acknowledging 
 
 16. See infra Part V (analyzing In re 2003 Low Income Hous. Tax Credit Qualified 
Allocation Plan, 848 A.2d 1 (2004)). 
 17. In re 2003, 848 A.2d at 9, 15. 
 18. Id. at 28. 
 19. Id. at 10. 
 20. Some localists are regionalists as well. See, e.g., David Barron, The Community 
Economic Development Movement: A Metropolitan Perspective, 56 STAN. L. REV. 701, 704 (2003) 
(reviewing WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE COMMUNITY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT MOVEMENT AND THE 
NEW SOCIAL POLICY (2001)). But cf. GERALD E. FRUG, CITY MAKING: BUILDING COMMUNITIES 
WITHOUT BUILDING WALLS 64-66 (1999) (proposing decentralization of power from cities). 
 21. Barron, supra note 20, at 703-05; see FRUG, supra note 20, at 9-12 (noting the potential 
for tensions between community development advocates and regionalists). 
 22. Not all regionalists attach the same importance to race. See NEAL R. PEIRCE ET AL., 
CITISTATES 151-53 (1993) (arguing that race is less important to the regional dynamic than a 
shared agenda focusing on security, economic prospects, and quality of life). 
 23. See, e.g.,  DAVID RUSK, CITIES WITHOUT SUBURBS 47 (1995) (arguing that city centers 
become “catch basins” for poor blacks and Hispanics and that fragmented local government 
“reinforces racial and economic segregation”); Michael H. Schill & Susan M. Wachter, The 
Spatial Bias of Federal Housing Law and Policy: The Concentrated Poverty in Urban America, 
143 U. PA. L. REV. 1285, 1299-1300 (1995) (noting the racial segregation of public housing and 
the tendency of minority residents to earn “extremely low incomes”); Florence Wagman Roisman, 
Intentional Racial Discrimination and Segregation by the Federal Government as a Principal 
Cause of Concentrated Poverty: A Response to Schill and Wachter, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1351, 1356-
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that affordable units are critically important parts of racially stable, 
mixed-income neighborhoods, with racially and socially integrated 
schools, regionalists claim that concentrated poverty and 
resegregation cause communities to decline.24 
Advocates of community development and city leaders assert 
that targeting affordable housing in poor neighborhoods can revitalize 
those neighborhoods.25  Specifically, proponents link community 
development of housing with increased investment, government 
interest, community pride, and improved neighborhood appearance.26  
Regional approaches to problems in distressed areas, they argue, often 
lack the support of minority communities, which fear losing political 
power and community control of services.27 Segregated, fiscally poor 
cities need investment of any kind, and the LIHTC is virtually the 
only capital available to neighborhoods that have been effectively 
redlined by the private market.28 
While this Article uses In re 2003 to illustrate the tension 
between the FHA and the siting preferences in the LIHTC statute, it 
is fundamentally about the deep legal and philosophical contradiction 
in the United States between civil rights guarantees—particularly the 
duty to affirmatively further fair housing—and state and federal low-
income housing policy. 
In Part II, the Article details the housing discrimination that 
results in the creation of neighborhoods of concentrated poverty.  It 
discusses the demographic pattern of black and Latino 
suburbanization and how housing discrimination contributes to the 
process of resegregation of areas from all white to all people of color.  
It explains these changes in the context of a larger and related social 
 
60 (1995) (arguing that public housing and other federal programs create and maintain racial 
discrimination and concentrate poverty). 
 24. See infra Part II.A (discussing the regional problem of housing discrimination and 
concentrated poverty). 
 25. See PAUL S. GROGAN & TONY PROSCIO, COMEBACK CITIES: A BLUEPRINT FOR URBAN 
NEIGHBORHOOD REVIVAL 99-101 (2000) (examining community development corporations’ 
(“CDCs”) successful neighborhood investment in housing); AVIS C. VIDAL, REBUILDING 
COMMUNITIES: A NATIONAL STUDY OF URBAN COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATIONS 96-98 
(1992) (listing success statistics for CDCs’ affordable housing efforts). 
 26. See VIDAL, supra note 25, at 96-98. 
 27. BENNETT HARRISON, URBAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 128-30 (1974). Community-based 
development was embraced initially by people of color because attempts at integrating housing 
had been largely unsuccessful, due to white resistance. ROBERT HALPERN, REBUILDING THE 
INNER CITY 129 (1995). 
 28. Fiscally poor cities often seek out waste incinerators, prisons, gambling, and heavy 
industry that cities with a stronger fiscal basis would eschew. Attorneys, bond houses, and 
builders (some of whom are among the few successful minority contractors in a given region), 
also have deep interests in the maintaining direct investment in distressed areas and are often 
closely connected to the political establishment. 
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and fiscal stratification of U.S. metropolitan communities.  
Understanding the link between segregation, the concentration of 
poverty, resegregation, and community decline is at the heart of the 
FHA’s “affirmatively further” provision.  The costs of concentrated 
poverty caused by segregation and resegregation are outlined, as are 
the benefits of integration. 
Part III places the federal FHA in historical and legal context, 
showing the development of the duty to affirmatively further 
integration.  Part IV details the placement of LIHTC family units, 
which often have been concentrated in poor and resegregating 
neighborhoods, and discusses recent scholarship indicating that the 
siting of tax credit units is not revitalizing poor, segregated 
communities.  Part V uses In re 2003 as a case study, outlining the 
positions of the various parties in the New Jersey case, their 
arguments, and the court’s decision. 
In Part VI, the Article applies the FHA to the tax credit 
program.  It argues that the history and significance of civil rights law 
requires that the fair housing duty be considered before all others, 
including the siting preferences guiding the LIHTC program.  Based 
on law, regionalist policy, and empirical evidence, this Article argues 
that the government should prioritize locating low-income housing in 
places with strong schools, economic opportunity, and plentiful local 
resources.  It provides approaches for preserving affordable housing in 
rapidly gentrifying neighborhoods with segregated schools and 
maintaining or enhancing integration in communities that are 
unstably integrated.29 
 
 29. These principles apply with equal force to the administration of the other important 
federal housing programs such as Hope VI, the Community Reinvestment Act, and the HOME 
program. See Philip Tegeler, The Persistence of Segregation in Government Housing Programs, in 
THE GEOGRAPHY OF OPPORTUNITY: RACE AND HOUSING CHOICE IN METROPOLITAN AMERICA 197, 
203-209 (Xavier de Souza Briggs ed., 2005) (examining desegregation and the concentration of 
poverty in the context of HOPE VI, the Community Reinvestment Act, and the HOME Program). 
  
108 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. XX:N:nnn 
II. THE REGIONAL PROBLEM OF SEGREGATION AND CONCENTRATED 
POVERTY 
A.  Housing Discrimination and Concentrated Poverty 
Pervasive housing discrimination by private actors helped to 
create and currently maintains poor, minority neighborhoods.30  Until 
at least the end of World War II, physical violence, racial zoning, and 
discriminatory real estate practices kept blacks tightly confined in 
ghetto areas and out of white areas.31  In many cities, white property 
owners attached restrictive covenants to deeds that forbade blacks 
from buying homes in their neighborhoods.32  Real estate agencies 
engaged in a variety of discriminatory practices, including racial 
steering of blacks and whites away from each other and blockbusting, 
which involves selling a few homes in a white neighborhood to black 
tenants, buying neighboring homes at lower prices from panicked 
white homeowners, and then selling the homes to middle-income 
blacks at a premium.33 
To this day, blacks and Latinos at all income levels are 
discriminated against by real estate agents, who show them only a 
small subset of the market and steer whites away from communities 
with people of color.34 Mortgage lenders also systematically lend less 
mortgage money to blacks and Latinos compared to whites of 
comparable income and background.35  These patterns of housing 
discrimination and resegregation do not stop at central city borders 
but also affect large parts of suburbia.  A recent study of metropolitan 
 
 30. DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID 12-14 (1993). 
 31. Id. at 36-37. 
 32. Id. Racially restrictive covenants were declared unconstitutional in the 1940s. Shelley v. 
Kramer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948). 
 33. See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 30, at 38. 
 34. See MARGERY AUSTIN TURNER ET AL., URBAN INST., DISCRIMINATION IN METROPOLITAN 
HOUSING MARKETS 3-1 to 3-19, 6-1 to 6-13 (2002), available at http://www.huduser.org/ 
Publications/pdf/Phase1_Report.pdf (summarizing discrimination data from 2000); JOHN YINGER, 
CLOSED DOORS, OPPORTUNITIES LOST 51-61 (1995) (examining racial and ethnic steering 
phenomena); see generally George C. Galster, Racial Steering in Urban Housing Markets: A 
Review of Audit Evidence, 18 REV. BLACK POL. ECON 105 (1990) (same). 
 35. See John Yinger, Cash in Your Face: The Cost of Racial and Ethnic Discrimination in 
Housing, 42 J. URB. ECON. 339, 340 (1997) (providing research based on Home Mortgage 
Disclosure Act data finding that discrimination in housing and financing markets costs blacks 
and Hispanics, on average, more than $3,000 whether or not they actually encounter 
discrimination); YINGER, supra note 34, at 69-70 (1995) (analyzing HMDA data and finding stark 
racial differences in lending policy, even when controlling for differences in lenders and 
individual economic characteristics of the borrower). 
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Boston showed that nearly half of black homebuyers were 
concentrated in only 7 of 126 communities.36 
Federal housing policy has also historically limited the housing 
opportunities of minorities.  Starting in the 1940s, the Federal 
Housing Administration began to guarantee loans with 10 percent 
down payments, lower interest rates, and longer mortgage periods.37  
Although whites in overwhelming numbers used these loans to build 
homes in the suburbs, discriminatory practices prevented blacks from 
following them.38  The housing authority would not provide low-cost 
loans to “inharmonious racial or nationality groups”—a code for blacks 
moving into white neighborhoods.39  The private market followed the 
government’s lead and did not make loans to individuals in 
neighborhoods that were “redlined” on Federal Housing 
Administration investment maps.40 
Government siting of public housing has been particularly 
responsible for fostering segregation.41  Since the 1930s, housing 
authorities have sited public housing in inner cities and, since 1969, 
filled them with poor tenants, instead of encouraging mixed income, 
racially stable communities.42  Several studies have shown that if the 
federal government had not segregated public housing or the tenants 
of public housing, school desegregation would not have been 
necessary.43  Though some officials claim that siting low-income 
housing in poor neighborhoods revitalizes those communities 
economically, a recent literature review commissioned by the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) found that 
 
 36. GUY STUART, THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, HARVARD UNIV., SEGREGATION IN THE BOSTON 
METROPOLITAN AREA AT THE END OF THE 20TH CENTURY (2000), available at 
http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/research/metro/housing_boston.php (referring to 
evidence presented in the report’s unpaginated executive summary). Additionally, white 
suburbanites are not shown integrated markets. TURNER ET. AL, supra note 34, at 6-1. 
 37. MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 30, at 53. Until the postwar period, it was hard for most 
Americans to own a home. Id. Homes, built one at a time, were expensive and required a 33 
percent down payment, and a short five-to-ten-year period for payment. Id. 
 38. Id. at 54-55. 
 39. Id. at 54. 
 40. Id. at 55. 
 41. Schill & Wachter, supra note 23, at 1295; Roisman, supra note 23, at 1357; see Robert 
Gray & Steven Tursky, Local and Racial/Ethnic Occupancy for HUD Subsidized Family 
Housing in Ten Metropolitan Areas, in HOUSING DESEGREGATION AND FEDERAL POLICY 235, 239 
(John M. Goering ed., 1986) (finding that HUD-subsidized rental housing was concentrated in a 
relatively small number of minority-occupied census tracts). 
 42. Schill & Wachter, supra note 23, at 1291-1300. 
 43. See Gary Orfield, Metropolitan School Desegregation: Impacts on Metropolitan Society, 
80 MINN. L. REV. 825, 854 (1996) (discussing HUD-sponsored studies showing that had HUD 
housing been placed more proportionally in white or stably integrated neighborhoods, busing 
would not have been necessary). 
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the balance of evidence shows that low-income housing, by itself, does 
not have a revitalizing effect on very poor, segregated neighborhoods.44  
The review cited studies of Baltimore, Cleveland, Milwaukee, and 
Philadelphia, showing that adding low-income units in poor 
segregated neighborhoods is likely to further depress the value of 
housing.45  As neighborhoods undergo the process of becoming deeply 
poor and segregated, they frequently lose significant population 
density.46  The literature review followed several studies showing that 
in very poor segregated neighborhoods, low income tenants often move 
out of older, standard, habitable housing into newer, subsidized 
units.47  Because market demand in these neighborhoods is not strong, 
the older, standard, habitable housing is simply abandoned leading 
either to no net gain or even a loss of affordable units.48 
B. Resegregation and Racial Change 
Concentrated poverty and minority isolation run intertwined 
with the process of resegregation.  Typically, after a number of black 
or Latino residents move to a neighborhood, white demand for housing 
declines49—first in households with children and later for the broader 
 
 44. See JILL KHADDURI ET AL., ABT ASSOC., TARGETING HOUSING PRODUCTION SUBSIDIES: 
LITERATURE REVIEW  68-73 (2003) [hereinafter ABT LITERATURE REVIEW] (examining various low 
income housing programs); JILL KHADDURI ET AL., ABT ASSOC., MAKING THE BEST USE OF THE 
LOW INCOME HOUSING TAX CREDIT 19-22 (2004); DAVID RUSK, INSIDE GAME OUTSIDE GAME 
(1999) (survey of community development corporations (CDCs), philanthropists, and housing 
groups showing that, during the 1970s and 1980s, the communities being served by these CDCs 
became poor and more segregated than surrounding communities, without exception); Henry 
Louis Taylor, Jr. & Sam Cole, Structural Racism and Efforts to Radically Reconstruct the Inner-
City Built Environment, Address at the Ass’n of Collegiate Sch. of Planning Conference 3 (Nov. 
8-11, 2001), http://thecyberhood.net/Urban_Syllabi/PD%20506%20Intro%20Urban%20Mgmt%20 
Syllabus%20Fall%202003.pdf (“The traditional approach to community revitalization has not 
produced a model for transforming inner city neighborhoods and making them great places to 
live, work, and raise a family.”). 
 45. ABT LITERATURE REVIEW, supra note 44, at 42-43, 45, 58-63. In contrast, adding such 
units to high income or middle-class neighborhoods does not depress values and may even cause 
a modest increase or modest stabilization in value in neighborhoods that are just beginning the 
process of decline. Id at 75. It is important to note that these studies also found that there is no 
evidence that subsidized housing lowers home value prices in mixed income or affluent 
neighborhoods. Id. at 57-62. 
 46. See generally MYRON ORFIELD, AMERICAN METROPOLITICS: THE NEW SUBURBAN 
REALITY 54-55 (2002) (noting that, as poverty rises in central cities, middle-class flight and 
business disinvestment intensify and local retailers have fewer customers). 
 47. See ABT LITERATURE REVIEW, supra note 44, at 53-57 (analyzing “crowding out” data). 
 48. See id. at 53 (discussing crowding out and abandonment); Michael P. Murray, 
Subsidized and Unsubsidized Housing Stocks 1935-1987: Crowding Out and Cointegration, 18 J. 
REAL EST. FIN. & ECON. 107, 119 (1999) (same). 
 49. See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 30, at 96 (noting that white housing demand falls as 
blacks move into the neighborhood). 
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middle-class—lowering housing prices.50  In a housing market where 
Americans on average will change residences eleven times in their 
lives,51 the black and Latino middle class are not large enough to 
sustain the demand and price of houses in the neighborhood.52  Thus, 
when white middle-class families withdraw, the laws of supply and 
demand lower prices,53 and low income minorities move into the 
housing left behind.54  Businesses and jobs soon follow the white 
middle-class, taking with them a portion of the tax base.55 
A study by the Institute of Race and Poverty (“IRP”) found 
striking evidence of resegregation in some of the largest metropolitan 
areas in the United States.56  An analysis of fifteen large metro 
regions between 1980 and 2000 found that a majority of blacks and 
Latinos now live in suburban cities.57  The IRP found that many 
neighborhoods which at one point in time appeared to be integrated 
were actually in a period of racial transition.58  Many of these 
neighborhoods experienced racial transition only if the non-white 
population exceeded 20 to 30 percent.59  Census data also shows that 
integrated census tracts which had a black population percentage in 
the mid-30s in 1980 were more likely to make the transition to 
predominantly black during the next twenty years than they were to 
 
 50. See ORFIELD, supra note 46, at 10. 
 51. Tom Vanderbilt, Self-Storage Nation, SLATE, July 18, 2005, http://slate.msn.com/id/ 
2122832/. 
 52. See ORFIELD, supra note 46, at 13-14 (“[T]he ranks of middle-class blacks and Latinos in 
most metropolitan areas are currently too small to maintain a robust middle-class housing 
market if middle-class whites are not also interested in that market.”). 
 53. Id. at 11. 
 54. Id. 
 55. The pattern of resegregation, flight and tipping is complex. See George Galster et al., 
Identifying Neighborhood Thresholds: An Empirical Exploration, 11 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 701 
(2000) (arguing that once key indicators of quality of life, such as the percentage of professionals 
living in a neighborhood, reach threshold levels, rapid changes follow); Roberto Quercia & George 
Galster, Threshold Effects and Neighborhood Change, 20 J. PLAN. EDUC. & RES. 146, 154 (2000) 
(examining educational attainment and the threshold percentage of professionals in a 
neighborhood). Some have argued that the “invasion-succession” model may be less applicable in 
contexts involving Hispanic and Asian residents. David Fasenfest et al., Living Together: A New 
Look At Racial And Ethnic Integration In Metropolitan Neighborhoods, LIVING CENSUS SERIES, 
Apr. 2004, at 1, 15, available at http://www.brookings.edu/dybdocroot/urban/pubs/20040428 
_fasenfest.htm. 
 56. Myron Orfield and Tom Luce, Inst. on Race & Poverty, Minority Suburbanization and 
Racial Change: Stable Integration, Neighborhood Transition and the Need for Regional 
Approaches, Address at Race and Regionalism Conference 4 (May 6-7, 2005), http://www. 
irpumn.org/uls/resources/projects/MinoritySubn_050605wMAPS.pdf. 
 57. Id. at 1. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 8. 
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remain integrated.60  Moreover, black and Latino suburbanites are 
more likely than whites to relocate to fiscally distressed suburbs.  
Although resegregation is not inevitable, integrated areas with a 
majority of black residents tend to become more black over time.61  
Communities that have practiced “managed integration”—employing 
a series of pro-integrative financial incentives, careful oversight of real 
estate practices, and marketing strategies geared to maintain the 
housing demand of whites when evidence of resegregation appears—
have shown frequent success in maintaining social and economic 
integration for generations.62 
Racial change in schools almost previews social change in the 
housing market.  In most cases, when schools become more black and 
Latino, they become poorer, and within a generation, the 
neighborhood follows.63  The most rapid racial and economic 
resegregation in schools is now occurring in older suburbs.64  When 
middle-class black and Latino residents reach a critical mass in 
previously white neighborhoods and schools, white homebuyers 
perceive the community to be in decline65 and choose not to buy 
there.66  Once the minority share in a community school increases to a 
threshold level (usually 10 to 20 percent), racial transition accelerates 
until minority percentages reach very high levels (greater than 80 
percent).67 
Despite this evidence of discrimination, conventional wisdom 
holds that patterns of segregation are simply the result of individual 
preferences. The Supreme Court in Freeman v. Pitts exemplified this 
view by finding that a pattern of segregation was the result of private 
 
 60. Id. 
 61. Lynette Rawlings et al., Race and Residence: Prospects for Stable Neighborhood 
Integration, NEIGHBORHOOD CHANGE IN URB. AM., Mar. 2004, at 1, 4, 8, available at http://www. 
urban.org/UploadedPDF/310985_NCUA3.pdf. 
 62. ORFIELD, supra note 46, at 125-26. 
 63. Id. at 9-11. 
 64. ERIKA FRANKENBERG & CHUNGMEI LEE, THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, HARVARD UNIV., 
RACE IN AMERICAN PUBLIC SCHOOLS: RAPIDLY RESEGREGATING SCHOOL DISTRICTS 7 (2002), 
available at http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/research/deseg/Race_in_American_Public 
_Schools1.pdf. Minorities continue to suburbanize in increasing numbers. In Minneapolis, for 
instance, 51% of blacks at or above median income lived in the suburbs, up from 44 percent a 
decade earlier. E-mail from Eric Myott, Geographic Information Specialist, Institute on Race and 
Poverty, University of Minnesota, to Scott Crain, Research Fellow, Institute on Race and 
Poverty, University of Minnesota (Sept. 12, 2005, 12:12pm) (on file with author). 
 65. This belief is fueled both by white racism and legitimate observation of the harms of 
resegregation on neighborhoods. 
 66. See generally HARVEY MOLOTCH, MANAGED INTEGRATION: DILEMMAS OF DOING GOOD IN 
THE CITY 148-73 (1972) (examining the “white flight” phenomenon). 
 67. Change occurs fastest at levels of 20% to 50% and proceeds in most cases until schools 
are highly segregated. ORFIELD, supra note 46, at 10. 
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choices. The Court approvingly cited a lower court’s reliance on a 
study which indicated that blacks and Latinos preferred 50/50 
integrated neighborhoods and whites were uncomfortable with more 
than a 10 percent black and Latino population, making segregation 
inevitable.68  Courts and legal commentators have cited this finding as 
fact, and it has cast a huge shadow over the law and, hence, the 
landscape of reform.  However, the study’s authors have recently 
written that the Court’s analysis was inadequate and that significant 
and increasing evidence shows the ability of blacks and whites to live 
together on a long-term stable basis, particularly when a conscious 
integration plan is in place.69 
C.  Harms of Residential Segregation and Concentrated Poverty 
Discrimination, resegregation, and larger patterns of 
governmental fragmentation70 limit most members of the black and 
Latino middle-classes to living in areas with increasing poverty and 
diminishing opportunity.  By the year 2000, about half of both the 
black and Latino middle classes–over ten million households–had 
suburbanized in the 100 largest regions.71  Because of housing 
discrimination, however, blacks and Latinos leaving the city often 
ended up in at-risk, older suburbs, which are characterized by older 
housing stock, slow growth, and low tax bases—the resources that 
support public services and schools.72  The poorest of these places were 
either resegregated or deeply in the process of resegregation, with at-
risk suburbs seeing twice the percentage of blacks and Latinos and 
nearly twice the number of poor children as regional averages.73  This 
combination of factors clearly implies fewer opportunities for middle 
 
 68. Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 495 (1992). 
 69. Reynolds Farley et al., The Residential Preferences of Blacks and Whites: A Four-
Metropolis Analysis, 8 HOUS. POL’Y DEBATE 763, 794 (1997) (summarizing statistics showing 
tolerance of integrated neighborhoods). The district court relied on an earlier study of Detroit by 
Reynolds Farley. Id. at 768-73 (citing Reynolds Farley, et al., Chocolate City, Vanilla Suburbs: 
Will the Trend Towards Racially Separate Communities Continue?, 7 SOC. SCI. RESEARCH 319 
(1978)). 
 70. See ORFIELD, supra note 46, at 131-33 (noting areas of fragmentation by numbers of 
local governments per 100,000 residents). 
 71. Orfield & Luce, supra note 56, at 1. 
 72. See ORFIELD, supra note 46, at 37-42 (discussing the challenges faced by three 
categories of “at risk” suburban communities that are often a destination for minorities: 
“segregated,” “older,” and “low density”). Approximately 40% of metropolitan residents live in 
these sorts of suburbs. Id. at 2. 
 73. See id. at 37-42 (discussing the resegregation of “at-risk” suburban communities and 
noting that these communities’ poverty rates are “nearly twice the regional average”). 
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class minorities than their white counterparts in education, wealth 
acquisition through equity in homes, and employment opportunities.74 
Few blacks and Latinos live in bedroom-developing suburbs,75 
which have average-to-below-average tax bases, low poverty schools, 
and some jobs and office space.76  Still fewer minorities live in affluent 
job centers,77 which have low poverty schools, high tax bases, and little 
affordable housing.78 
Because of their concentration in distressed, racially 
segregated cities and inner suburbs, the majority of poor blacks and 
Latinos live in poor neighborhoods and attend overwhelmingly low 
income schools, while poor whites, who do not face housing 
discrimination and live more dispersed throughout suburbia, live in 
middle-income neighborhoods and attend middle-class schools.79  
Children who grow up in predominately poor neighborhoods and 
attend very low income schools face many barriers to academic and 
occupational achievement, even if they themselves are not poor.  
Studies show they are far more likely than their middle-class 
counterparts to drop out of high school or to become pregnant as 
teenagers.80  Long-term racial and social isolation in deprived 
 
 74. In Chicago and Atlanta, for instance, the black middle class moved to socially and 
fiscally limited suburbs. Id. at 14. Additionally, the black middle-class in Washington D.C. is 
moving southeast of the city to Prince George’s County, one of the poorest suburban counties in 
the nation, while job opportunities move west toward Dulles Airport and beyond. MYRON 
ORFIELD, METROPOLITAN AREA RESEARCH, WASHINGTON METROPOLITICS: A REGIONAL AGENDA 
FOR COMMUNITY AND STABILITY 43 (1999); see SHERYLL CASHIN, THE FAILURES OF INTEGRATION: 
HOW RACE AND CLASS ARE UNDERMINING THE AMERICAN DREAM 135-36 (2004) (arguing that 
black suburban enclaves, like Prince George’s County, “are usually in the opposite direction from 
the centers of highest economic growth”). 
 75. These comprise about 25% of the metropolitan population. ORFIELD, supra note 46, at 2. 
 76. Id. at 33, 42-44. 
 77. These areas comprise about 7% of the metropolitan population. Id. at 3. 
 78. Id. at 44-46. 
 79. While there are some very high-poverty white neighborhoods in Appalachia and in some 
older rust belt cities, more than 95% of poor whites in the United States live outside of high-
poverty neighborhoods. See PAUL A. JARGOWSKY, POVERTY AND PLACE: GHETTOS, BARRIOS, AND 
THE AMERICAN CITY 135-36 (1997). By contrast, approximately 25% of poor blacks and Latinos 
live in neighborhoods of high poverty. Id. 
 80. Jonathan Crane, Effects of Neighborhoods on Dropping Out of School and Teenage 
Childbearing, in THE URBAN UNDERCLASS 299, 317-18 (C. Jenks & P. Peterson eds., 1991). 
Dropout rates of 50% or more are thirty times more common among schools where the majority 
of students are minorities. See ROBERT BALFANZ & NETTIE LEGTERS, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIV. CTR. 
FOR SOC. ORG. OF SCHS., LOCATING THE DROPOUT CRISIS 2-3 (2004) (identifying the lack of a 
direct and common measure of high school dropout or graduation rates at the school level and 
proposing “promoting power,” a comparison of the number of freshmen at a high school and the 
number of seniors four years later as a viable indirect measure); CHRISTOPHER B. SWANSON, THE 
URBAN INST. EDUC. POLICY CTR., WHO GRADUATES? WHO DOESN’T? A STATISTICAL PORTRAIT OF 
PUBLIC HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATION CLASS OF 2001 4-9 (2004) (discussing United States 
Department of Education Common Cire Data (CCD) and a Cumulative Promotion Index (CPI) 
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neighborhoods with high percentages of single parent families also 
leads to the formation of gangs and other forms of “oppositional 
culture.”81  In addition, racial and social isolation leads to linguistic 
isolation, limiting employment opportunities for poor minorities.82  
Concentrated poverty neighborhoods have very high crime rates, often 
multiples of the suburban violent crime rate, and huge health 
disparities resulting from the concentration of environmental hazards, 
stress, inadequate health care facilities, and poor quality, expensive 
food.83  These problems associated with poverty make it even more 
difficult for teachers to do their jobs in public schools.84 
D. Benefits of Racial and Socioeconomic Integration 
All individuals—including poor people of color—benefit from 
living in affluent and opportunity-rich neighborhoods with large tax 
bases and abundant entry-level jobs.  Overwhelmingly, these are 
majority-white neighborhoods.  The facts and outcome of Hills v. 
Gautreaux, discussed extensively in Part III, show the effect of poor 
black families’ exposure to concentrated opportunity rather than 
concentrated poverty.85  The remedial program allowed largely low-
income black households to live in three types of areas: poor 
segregated neighborhoods, white revitalizing neighborhoods (with 
poor segregated schools), and affluent neighborhoods.86  Researchers 
studying the families found that women with low incomes who moved 
to the largely white, opportunity rich suburbs clearly experienced 
 
calculated from this data as a basis for arriving at high school graduation rates); GARY ORFIELD 
ET AL., HARVARD CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, LOSING  OUR FUTURE: HOW MINORITY YOUTH ARE BEING 
LEFT BEHIND BY THE GRADUATION RATE CRISIS 9-10 (2004) (asserting that “the most useful and 
accurate estimates of high school graduation rates” are calculated using the CCD and CPI). 
 81. Signathia Fordham, Racelessness as a Factor in Black Students’ School Success: 
Pragmatic Strategy or Pyrrhic Victory?, 58 HARV. EDUC. REV. 54, 55-58 (1988); see John Ogbu, 
Minority Education and Caste, in MAJORITY AND MINORITY 370, 379 (Norman R. Yetman ed., 
1985) (discussing how the racial “caste” system prompts black parents to socialize their children 
in a manner that does not “teach [these] children the instrumental behavior necessary for 
achieving their academic goals”). 
 82. See Joleen Kirschenman & Kathryn Neckerman, “We’d Love to Hire Them, But . . . ”: 
The Meaning of Race for Employers, in THE URBAN UNDERCLASS, supra note 80, at 203, 220 
(reporting that employers view job seekers negatively if they cannot communicate in standard 
English). 
 83. See, e.g., Robert Bullard, Building Safe, Just, and Healthy Communities, 12 TUL. 
ENVTL. L.J. 373, 380-85 (1999) (arguing specific environmental and health hazards present in 
housing projects to be evidence of a “legacy of environmental racism”). 
 84. Gary Orfield, Urban Schooling and the Perpetuation of Job Inequality in Metropolitan 
Chicago, in URBAN LABOR MARKETS AND JOB OPPORTUNITY (George E. Peterson & Wayne 
Vroman eds., 1992). 
 85. See infra Part III.C.2 (discussing the Gautreaux litigation). 
 86. Id. 
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improved employment and earnings, even in the absence of job 
training and placement services.87  Individuals who lived in affluent 
white suburbs, as opposed to predominantly black city neighborhoods, 
were about 14 percent more likely to be employed than those who 
remained in the city.88  The families also noted, when interviewed, 
that they found the suburbs to be much safer for their families.89  
Finally, the Gautreaux children performed significantly better in 
school after moving to more affluent areas.90  Rosenbaum found that 
the children of suburban movers dropped out of high school less 
frequently than the city movers (5 percent versus 20 percent) and 
maintained their grades despite the higher standards of suburban 
schools.91  These children were also much more likely to be on a college 
track, with 54 percent going to college, compared with 21 percent of 
those who stayed in the city.92  Moreover, 75 percent of the suburban 
youth had jobs, compared with 41 percent in the city.93 
The families in “revitalizing areas” made some gains but not as 
substantial as the families who moved to the suburbs.  The schools in 
these revitalizing neighborhoods differed from the racial and 
socioeconomic makeup of their neighborhoods.  They were either 
segregated or in a rapid progress of segregation, and the evidence 
showed that the children did not experience the same change in 
opportunity that the suburban movers did.  Nor did the parents, who 
had essentially the same access to the employment as they did before 
moving, experience much more economic opportunity. 
 
 87. James E. Rosenbaum & Susan J. Popkin, Employment and Earnings of Low-Income 
Blacks Who Move to Middle-Class Suburbs, in THE URBAN UNDERCLASS, supra note 80, at 342, 
343, 348. These researchers studied the groups as “city movers” and “suburban movers,” not 
necessarily analyzing the three-part complexity of the remedial program. Id. at 348. 
 88. Id. at 350. Employment was easier to find in the suburbs because there were more jobs, 
they said. Id. at 352. The new suburban residents said that simply living in the suburbs gave 
them a stronger motivation to improve themselves and get jobs. “[The housing project] 
deteriorates you. You don’t want to do anything . . . . [Living in the suburbs] made me feel that 
I’m worth something. I can do anything I want if I get up and try it,” said a young woman who 
had recently been promoted at work. Id. 
 89. Id. at 352. 
 90. LEONARD S. RUBINOWITZ & JAMES E. ROSENBAUM, CROSSING THE CLASS AND COLOR 
LINES: FROM PUBLIC HOUSING TO WHITE SUBURBIA 164-66 (2000); see John Goering, Political 
Origins and Opposition, in CHOOSING A BETTER LIFE?: EVALUATING THE MOVING TO 
OPPORTUNITY SOCIAL EXPERIMENT 37, 40 (John Goering & Judith D. Feins eds., 2000) (“[The 
Gautreaux] children were less likely to drop out of school and more likely to take college-track 
classes than were their Gautreaux peers who had moved to poorer, relatively segregated parts of 
Chicago.”). 
 91. RUBINOWITZ & ROSENBAUM, supra note 90, at 164. 
 92. Id. at 165. 
 93. Id. at 166. 
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The above findings from Gautreaux as well as other research 
bear out the consensus by social scientists that integration has long-
term benefits for people of the black and Latino poor.  Blacks, Latinos, 
and whites from desegregated elementary schools are more likely than 
their counterparts from segregated schools to attend a desegregated 
college, live in a desegregated neighborhood, work in a desegregated 
environment, and possess high career aspirations.94  A study of some 
of the nation’s most selective law schools showed that the vast 
majority of the students had attended desegregated colleges.95  
Moreover, diverse educational settings contribute to students’ ability 
to participate in a pluralistic society.96 
III. HISTORY AND INTERPRETATION OF THE FAIR HOUSING ACT 
The Fair Housing Act and subsequent federal case law 
developed in response to the harms of segregation and resegregation.  
The authors of the FHA understood that the processes of housing 
discrimination, racial and economic segregation, disinvestment, white 
racism, and resegregation can only be countered by a strong systemic 
response.  The FHA ordered all federal government entities involved 
in housing and all their grantees97 to use, in language quoted in a 
circuit court opinion, their “immense leverage”98 to support a balanced 
and integrated living pattern.  This obligation orders a recalcitrant 
federal bureaucracy and its grantees to end their complicity in 
deepening existing segregation and in accelerating the resegregation 
of racially transitional neighborhoods to disadvantaged poor minority 
neighborhoods. 
 
 94. Robert Crain & Amy Stuart Wells, Perpetuation Theory and the Long-Term Effects of 
School Desegregation, 64 REV. EDUC. RES. 531, 541-52 (1994); JOMILLS HENRY BRADDOCK, CTR. 
FOR SOC. ORG. OF SCHOOLS, MORE EVIDENCE ON SOCIAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESSES THAT 
PERPETUATE MINORITY SEGREGATION: THE RELATIONSHIP OF SCHOOL DESEGREGATION AND 
EMPLOYMENT DESEGREGATION 3 (1983). 
 95. Gary Orfield & Dean Whitla, Diversity and Legal Education: Student Experiences in 
Leading Law Schools, in DIVERSITY CHALLENGED 143, 156 (Gary Orfield ed., 2001). 
 96. See, e.g., id. at 159-66 (discussing the perceived benefits of attending a desegregated law 
school). 
 97. See In re Adoption of 2003 Low Income Hous. Tax Credit Qualified Allocation Plan, 848 
A.2d 1, 12 (2004) (“Most federal cases addressing the ‘affirmatively to further’ issue hold or 
suggest that local housing agencies are bound by the Title VIII requirement.”). This is not 
regarded as a settled question, as the U.S. Supreme Court has yet to issue a ruling; however, 
other federal and state courts have either expressly accepted the applicability to grantees or 
have declined to address the issue. See ROBERT G. SCHWEMM, HOUSING DISCRIMINATION: LAW 
AND LITIGATION § 21:1 nn.7-8 (2004) (citing cases in which courts have accepted applicability to 
grantees or declined to address the issue). 
 98. NAACP v. Sec’y of Hous. & Urban Dev., 817 F.2d 149, 156 (1st Cir. 1987) (quoting 
NAACP v. Harris, 567 F. Supp. 637, 644 (D. Mass. 1987)). 
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Section 3608(d) of the FHA directs the federal government to 
use its powers to combat segregation and is of central importance to 
this Article.  It provides, in part, that “[a]ll executive departments and 
agencies shall administer their programs and activities relating to 
housing and urban development . . . in a manner affirmatively to 
further the purposes [of Title VIII].”99  As its social and legal context 
show, the Fair Housing Act of 1968 attempted to respond directly to 
the harms caused by racial and social isolation to individuals and 
communities.100 
A.  Social Context of the Fair Housing Act 
The Fair Housing Act arose out of a history of recent and 
longstanding housing discrimination.  In 1966, Martin Luther King, 
Jr., brought the southern civil rights movement north to Chicago to 
focus on open housing.101  At the time, the city under Mayor Richard J. 
Daley was in the midst of a largely federally funded urban renewal 
project that destroyed huge swaths of low-income housing in 
segregated neighborhoods.102  According to Daley’s plan, the displaced 
poor blacks were moved into massive housing projects dozens of blocks 
away from the business district—the now notorious Robert Taylor and 
Henry Horner homes.103  In the minds of Daley and his planners, the 
dilapidated bricks and mortar and the abandoned lots of the “pre-
improvement” neighborhoods were to blame for the horrific social 
conditions.  Despite claims by advocates of urban renewal that 
 
 99. 42 U.S.C. § 3608(d) (2005) (emphasis added). The section in its entirety provides: 
All executive departments and agencies shall administer their programs and activities 
relating to housing and urban development (including any Federal agency having 
regulatory or supervisory authority over financial institutions) in a manner 
affirmatively to further the purposes of this subchapter and shall cooperate with the 
[HUD] Secretary to further such purposes. 
Id. 
 100. Some have noted that the FHA was stripped of its enforcement provisions until the Fair 
Housing Amendments Act of 1988 and only provided a weak response to an overwhelming 
problem. See David Lyons, The Jurisprudence of Slavery Reparations: Corrective Justice, Equal 
Opportunity, and the Legacy of Slavery and Jim Crow, 84 B.U. L. REV. 1375, 1394 (2004) 
(“Congress enacted a Fair Housing Act in 1968, but only after it was stripped of enforcement 
provisions.”). 
 101. ADAM COHEN & ELIZABETH TAYLOR, AMERICAN PHARAOH 355-56 (2000). 
 102. Arnold Hirsch provides the most in-depth account of the massive relocation of low-
income housing and concentration of poor blacks in Chicago. ARNOLD R. HIRSCH, MAKING THE 
SECOND GHETTO: RACE AND HOUSING IN CHICAGO 1940-1960, at 241-46 (1983); see also COHEN & 
TAYLOR, supra note 101, at 188-90 (detailing how existing segregation was reinforced by a miles-
long strip of public housing projects divided from adjacent neighborhoods by a new expressway). 
 103. See Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 296 F.Supp. 907, 909-14 (N.D. Ill. 1969) (holding 
that racially discriminatory site selection for public housing projects violated the 1964 Civil 
Rights Act). 
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modern, high-rise housing would revitalize neighborhoods,104 areas 
with projects had, at best, only very short term improvements.105  By 
1970, these tracts showed the same declining opportunity and living 
conditions as the other parts of the south and west-side ghettoes.106  
Moreover, they retained their racially segregated character.107 
The Kerner Commission, whose report was influential in the 
passage of the FHA, recognized housing discrimination’s harms.108  In 
the summer of 1967, more than 150 social disturbances ranging “from 
minor disturbances to major outbursts including sustained and 
widespread looting of property” had occurred in the United States, 
overwhelmingly in segregated, black ghetto neighborhoods.109  In 
response, President Lyndon B. Johnson appointed a distinguished 
bipartisan presidential commission chaired by Otto Kerner, a former 
governor of Illinois.110  After investigating the riots and surveying the 
growing social science literature on the consequences of concentrated 
poverty, the Kerner Commission found racial segregation and 
ghettoization was a core cause of the riots.111  It recognized how 
segregation limits opportunities: “although jobs were rapidly moving 
to the suburbs. . .eighty percent of the nonwhite population of 
metropolitan areas in 1967 lived in central cities.”112  Echoing the 
rhetoric of Brown v. Board of Education,113 the Kerner Commission 
Report concluded that “[o]ur nation [was] moving toward two societies, 
 
 104. See COHEN & TAYLOR, supra note 101, at 186 (noting that even “progressives” in 
Chicago backed Mayor Daley’s efforts to build large high-rises on larger plots because they 
thought such development would give the city “the feel of a suburb”). 
 105. See id. at 331-32 (showing that “in the three years since the first family moved in, [a 
major public housing project] had spiraled downward”). 
 106. MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 30, at 56-57 (discussing the “new segregation of blacks – 
in economic as well as social terms . . . [b]y 1970, after two decades of urban renewal, public 
housing projects in most large cities became black reservations, highly segregated from the rest 
of society, and characterized by extreme social isolation”). 
 107. Id. 
By 1960 the growth and development of Chicago’s black areas of residence confirmed 
the existence of the city’s second ghetto. . . . Slums had been torn down . . . their 
occupants sent to feed the swelling movement of blacks into newly occupied provinces 
farther South or on the city’s West Side. 
HIRSCH, supra note 102, at 253. 
 108. John Charles Boger, Race and the American City: The Kerner Commission in 
Retrospect—An Introduction, 71 N.C. L. REV. 1289, 1295-98, 1305-06 (1993). 
 109. REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 15-16 (1968) 
[hereinafter KERNER REPORT]; see Boger, supra note 108, at 1292-95. 
 110. KERNER REPORT, supra note 109, at 1. 
 111. Id. at 5-6. 
 112. Jean Eberhart Dubofsky, Fair Housing: A Legislative History and a Perspective, 8 
WASHBURN L.J. 149, 153 (1969) (citing 114 CONG. REC. 3421 (1968)). 
 113. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (“[s]eparate education 
facilities are inherently unequal”). 
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one black, one white—separate and unequal.”114  The Commission 
recommended that a comprehensive civil rights bill with powerful 
integrative measures be enacted.115 
Three days after the release of the report the Senate voted 
cloture on the filibuster that had been blocking the fair housing bill for 
two years.116  The Senate passed the bill on March 11, 1968, sending it 
to the House where it faced a long struggle to emerge from the Rules 
Committee.117  On April 4, 1968, King was assassinated in Memphis.  
Riots erupted in Washington and around the country, and within 
days, the bill was dislodged from the Rules Committee and brought to 
a vote by the full House on April 10.118  President Johnson signed it 
the next day.119  Just as Johnson and congressional leaders used the 
tragic momentum of the Kennedy assassination to break the impasse 
with the 1964 Civil Rights Bill, they likewise used the momentum of 
Martin Luther King, Jr.’s assassination to move the final passage of 
Title VIII. 
B. Legislative History of “Affirmatively Further” 
The duty to “affirmatively further” fair housing in Title VIII 
came partially as a response to the resistance from HUD—which at 
the time was the primary federal source for affordable housing 
funds—and local housing authorities to build housing projects 
anywhere other than in poor, racially segregated neighborhoods.120  
President Kennedy, by executive order, forbade HUD from segregative 
housing practices,121 but HUD continued to build housing in poor 
segregated neighborhoods.  In the wake of the Civil Rights Bill of 
1964, Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society began one of the largest low 
 
 114. ROBERT G. SCHWEMM, HOUSING DISCRIMINATION LAW 33 (1983) (citing KERNER 
REPORT, supra note 109, at 1). 
 115. KERNER REPORT, supra note 109, at 263. Presciently, the commission also stated that 
while the nation should pursue a strategy of open housing and ghetto enrichment (community 
development) – that ghetto enrichment should be “no more than an interim strategy. Programs 
must be developed that will permit substantial Negro movement out of the ghettos. The primary 
goal must be a single society, in which every citizen will be free to live and work according to his 
capabilities and desires, not his color.” Id. at 11. 
 116. See Dubofsky, supra note 112, at 149-59 (explaining the delay and debate on the Act). 
 117. Id. at 159-60. 
 118. Id. at 160. 
 119. See Act of Apr. 11, 1968, Pub L. No. 90-284, tit. VIII, § 800, 82 Stat. 81 (1968) (passage 
of the Fair Housing Act). 
 120. See KERNER REPORT, supra note 109, at 13 (arguing that “federal housing programs 
must be given a new thrust aimed at overcoming the prevailing patterns of federal racism”). 
 121. Exec. Order No. 11,063, 27 Fed. Reg. 11,527 (Nov. 24, 1962). 
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income housing build-ups in history, giving mayors like Richard Daley 
the power and resources to even further concentrate poverty.122 
When challenged, HUD and local housing authorities 
attempted to shift the blame.  Local housing authorities with urban 
and suburban jurisdiction claimed their duty was to build housing and 
argued that they could not influence resistant white neighborhoods 
and municipalities.123  HUD in turn argued that it was simply a 
funding agency and could not influence local decisionmaking.124  In 
defiance of Kennedy’s executive order, HUD and local housing 
agencies continued to fund segregated public housing, arguing that 
housing in segregated ghettos was better than no housing at all.125 
As lawsuits progressed against HUD and the intransigence of 
housing authorities became clearer, pressure was building for a new 
civil rights act that would go significantly beyond Title VI of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964.  The sponsors of the FHA determined that the 
provisions of Title VI prohibiting discrimination in federally assisted 
housing needed to be strengthened.126  During the legislative debate 
on the FHA, Senator Brooke noted that “an overwhelming proportion 
of public housing . . . in the United States directly built, financed and 
supervised by the Federal Government—is racially segregated.”127  
Senator Walter Mondale also addressed the government’s complicity 
in promoting or perpetuating housing segregation, noting, “[urban 
 
 122. See generally COHEN & TAYLOR, supra note 101 (discussing Mayor Daley’s housing 
policies). 
 123. See Alexander Polikoff, Gautreaux and Institutional Litigation, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
451, 456-57 (1988) (showing that a housing authority could not escape liability on the basis that 
“practical politics” compelled it not to locate predominately African-American public housing 
projects in primarily white neighborhoods); Banks v. Perk, 341 F. Supp. 1175, 1179-84 (N.D. 
Ohio 1972), aff’d in part, rev’d in part without opinion, 473 F.2d 910 (6th Cir. 1973) (holding that 
a housing authority had an affirmative duty to locate public housing facilities in areas of varying 
racial composition). 
 124. Gautreaux v. Romney, 448 F.2d 731, 737-41 (7th Cir. 1971); Polikoff, supra note 123, at 
455, 462. But see In re 2003 Low Income Hous. Tax Credit Qualified Allocation Plan, 848 A.2d 1, 
23-24 (2004) (reasoning that a state agency was “a funding agency, rather than a siting agency” 
and had no statutory power to locate housing projects based upon neighborhood racial 
composition). 
 125. See RUBINOWITZ & ROSENBAUM, supra note 90, at 36 (noting choice between “funding [a] 
discriminatory program or depriv[ing] low-income families of much-needed housing”). 
 126. Indeed, years before the passage of both the 1964 and 1968 Civil Rights Acts, civil 
rights leaders were calling for more executive and congressional leadership to strengthen civil 
rights protections. DENTON L. WATSON, LION IN THE LOBBY: CLARENCE MITCHELL JR.’S STRUGGLE 
FOR THE PASSAGE OF CIVIL RIGHTS LAWS 445, 454-55 (1990). 
 127. Resident Advisory Board v. Rizzo, 425 F. Supp. 987, 1014 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (citing 114 
CONG. REC. 2528 (1968)). Senator Brooke also stated: “Rarely does HUD withhold funds or defer 
action in the name of desegregation. In fact, if it were not for all the printed guidelines the 
housing agencies have issued since 1964, one would scarcely know a Civil Rights Act had been 
passed.” 114 CONG. REC. 2527-28 (1968). 
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blacks] have been unable to move to suburban communities and other 
exclusively white areas.”128  The law specifically sought to prevent 
local authorities and HUD from avoiding responsibility for fair 
housing by blaming the other party for the lack of progress on 
integration.  It did so by requiring the federal government and its 
grantees, including local housing authorities, to use their power and 
leverage to support an integrated housing market.129 
The debates in Congress produced Title VIII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1968.  The linchpin of housing discrimination law is Section 
3608(d).130  It directs the federal government to use its powers to 
support an integrated housing market.  Prohibitions on steering and 
blockbusting by real estate agents, practices that lead to racial 
turnover, also show that avoiding resegregation was an implicit part 
of the fair housing mandate.131 
C.  Judicial and Regulatory Interpretation of the Duty to Affirmatively 
Further Fair Housing 
The development of HUD’s housing project siting rules reflects 
a clear decision by the federal courts to apply the FHA to all 
government housing decisions.  Because of the long history of 
segregation cases, the “affirmatively further” duty was developed 
through a back-and-forth process between and among courts and 
housing agencies.132  The current regulation owes much of its shape to 
the Third Circuit’s decision in Shannon v. HUD,133 and the Supreme 
 
 128. Resident Advisory Bd., 425 F. Supp. at 1014 (citing 114 CONG. REC. 2277 (1968)). 
Senator Mondale went on to implicate government, stating that “[a]n important factor 
contributing to [their exclusion] . . . has been the policies and practices of agencies of government 
at all levels.” Id. 
 129. Although the 1968 Act provides the backbone and the moral force to require an 
integrated housing market, the 1988 amendments gave it teeth. Fair Housing Amendments Act 
of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-430, 102 Stat. 1619 (1988). 
 130. See 42 U.S.C. § 3608(d) (2005) (requiring that “all executive departments and 
agencies . . . administer their programs and activities relating to housing and urban 
development . . . in a manner affirmatively to further [fair housing]”). Though the statute itself 
only requires the affirmative furthering of fair housing goals, the courts have glossed affirmative 
furtherance to include fostering integration. Roisman, supra note 2, at 1026. 
 131. See 42 U.S.C. § 3605 (2005) (prohibiting racial discrimination by “any person or other 
entity whose business includes engaging in residential real estate transactions”); 42 U.S.C. § 
3606 (2005) (prohibiting discrimination by providing for “access to membership or participation 
in any multiple-listing service, real estate brokers’ organization or other service, organization, or 
facility relating to the business of renting or selling dwellings”). 
 132. See Michael J. Vernarelli, Where Should HUD Locate Assisted Housing?, in HOUSING 
DESEGREGATION AND FEDERAL POLICY, supra note 41, at 214, 216-20 (discussing cases “of 
particular importance” to the development of HUD’s location policies). 
 133. Shannon v. United States Dep’t. of Hous. & Urban Dev., 436 F.2d 809 (3d Cir. 1970). 
  
200x] DESKTOP PUBLISHING EXAMPLE 123 
Court’s decision in Hills v. Gautreaux.134 These cases focus on the 
harms noted by the Kerner Commission and on a growing 
understanding of the harms of segregation and resegregation. 
 1.  Shannon v. HUD 
In Shannon v. HUD, black and white residents of a racially 
integrated neighborhood in Philadelphia claimed that the planned 
construction of a Section 212135 housing project on the site in their 
neighborhood selected by the local housing authority, located in an 
area with an already high concentration of low-income minorities, 
would further concentrate poor blacks in the neighborhood, thus 
leading to resegregation.136  Plaintiffs argued that by funding this 
development HUD would violate its Title VIII duty to affirmatively 
further fair housing.137  Although no regulations concerning the siting 
of public housing or Section 212 housing existed, anti-discrimination 
rules under the FHA and a low rent housing manual issued by HUD 
warned public housing agencies of the threat of resegregation.138 
The court found that the Title VIII duty was broader than the 
right guaranteed by the Equal Protection Clause and previous civil 
rights and housing legislation.139  Furthermore, with some narrow 
exceptions, the court found that the FHA forbids HUD from funding a 
project in a segregated or resegregating neighborhood.  The court 
noted that maintaining or increasing racial concentration created 
“urban blight” and was “prima facie” unacceptable under the FHA.140 
Significantly, the court held that HUD must take racial and 
socioeconomic data into consideration in siting housing, calling a 
colorblind approach “impermissible.”141  While leaving the 
development of this method to HUD’s discretion, the court suggested 
that HUD consider the racial composition of neighborhoods and their 
schools; the location of public, middle-class, and luxury housing; the 
 
 134. Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976); see Vernarelli, supra note 132, at 217-20 
(discussing the Shannon and Gautreaux cases). 
 135. 12 U.S.C. §1715z-1 (2005). Subsection (n) amended this statute, prohibiting the 
development of any new projects, while still honoring existing projects under the program. 12 
U.S.C. §1715z-1(n) (2005). 
 136. Shannon, 436 F.2d at 811-12. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. at 819-20. 
 139. See id. at 816 (reasoning that the FHA required HUD to “affirmatively promote fair 
housing”). At this time, the court cited regulations for public housing that did not fit this exact 
program, as the detailed fair housing regulations had not been developed. Id. at 816-17. 
 140. Id. at 821. 
 141. Id. at 820-21. 
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racial effect of local regulations; and past and current practices of local 
authorities.142  Although the holding and its logic were clear and 
sweeping, the court hedged its bets with the following dicta: “[we are 
not] suggesting that desegregation of housing is the only goal of the 
national housing policy.  There will be instances where a pressing case 
may be made for the rebuilding of a racial ghetto.”143 
The principles of Shannon were adopted and articulated 
outside the Third Circuit in the late 1980s’ case, NAACP v. Secretary 
of Housing and Urban Development.144  The case involved the 
reviewability of alleged violations of the Title VIII duty in the 
administration of housing programs in Boston.  HUD argued that, 
even if its actions were reviewable, its only duty under Title VIII was 
an obligation not to discriminate.145  Then-Circuit Judge Stephen 
Breyer, writing for the First Circuit panel, rejected HUD’s argument, 
applied the Shannon doctrine, and found that HUD should use its 
“immense leverage” to further integrated and balanced living 
patterns.146  On remand, the district court issued a declaratory 
judgment that metropolitan area-wide relief was necessary to remedy 
HUD’s failure to affirmatively further integration in Boston.147  
Outlining a model marketing plan, the court stated that the goal of 
the plan would be to “achieve a racial composition in assisted housing, 
in neighborhoods which are predominantly white, which reflects the 
racial composition of the City as a whole.”148 
 
 142. Id. at 821-22. 
 143. Id. at 822 (emphasis added). 
 144. See generally NAACP v. Sec’y of Hous. & Urban Dev., 817 F.2d 149 (1st Cir. 1987) 
(stating that Title VIII imposes a duty on HUD beyond simply refraining from discrimination). 
 145. Id. at 154. 
 146. Id. at 156 (citing NAACP v. Harris, 567 F. Supp. 637, 644 (D. Mass. 1983)). The First 
Circuit pragmatically argued the legislative history reflects an intention that HUD should “use 
its grant programs to assist in ending discrimination and segregation, to the point where the 
supply of genuinely open housing increases.” NAACP v. Sec’y of Hous. & Urban Dev., 817 F.2d at 
155. 
 147. NAACP v. Kemp, 721 F. Supp. 361, 368 (D. Mass. 1989). 
 148. Id. at 371-72. 
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2.  Gautreaux 
In the Gautreaux cases,149 the plaintiffs sued to obtain relief 
from HUD and the Chicago Public Housing Authority for 
discriminatory siting practices.150  The plaintiffs alleged violations of 
the federal Equal Protection Clause and pre-FHA civil rights acts, 
having filed the cases prior to the FHA’s enactment.151  The Gautreaux 
plaintiffs asked, as a remedy to past proven discriminatory housing 
policy, that 75 percent of new public housing be built in areas with 
fewer than 30 percent minorities and not within one mile of any area 
with 30 percent black population.152  By the time Gautreaux arrived in 
the Seventh Circuit, the FHA had been passed, Shannon was in the 
courts, and the lower reviewing courts had discussed the duty to 
affirmatively further fair housing.153  Noting that resegregation was a 
very real fear in Chicago, the Seventh Circuit stated that “‘[w]hite 
flight’ and ‘black concentration’ [are] the most serious domestic 
problem facing America today.”154  The part of the case concerning the 
legality of a metropolitan remedy for Chicago’s public housing market 
eventually made its way to the U.S. Supreme Court.  The Supreme 
Court declared a metropolitan area remedy to be “consistent with and 
supportive of” federal housing policy, including the duty of the federal 
government and local housing authorities to affirmatively further fair 
housing.155 
 
 149. The plaintiffs initially brought two cases, one against HUD and the other against the 
Chicago Public Housing Authority, which were later consolidated. Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. 
Auth., 503 F.2d 930, 931-34 (7th Cir. 1974). Gautreaux is one of the most important civil rights 
and local government law cases of the twentieth century, partly because it was a counterweight 
to Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974), which effectively prevented busing plans from 
crossing suburban boundaries. See Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I – The Structure of 
Local Government Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 106-07 (1990) (explaining Gautreaux in the context 
of local government power). 
 150. Gautreaux, 503 F.2d at 931-32. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 304 F. Supp. 736, 737-38 (N.D. Ill. 1969); E-mail 
from Alexander Polikoff, Attorney, Business and Professional People for the Public Interest, to 
David Arens, Managing Editor, Vanderbilt Law Review (Oct. 7, 2005, 17:09:00 CDT) [hereinafter 
Polikoff E-mail] (on file with author). When asked why he did not ask for 100% to be put in the 
suburbs as the Banks plaintiffs had, Alexander Polikoff, the chief litigator, said this was an ad 
hoc balancing appraisal to allow some funds to continue to flow to the inner city. He also said, 
“we just could not pull the rug out from everyone in the city.” There were a lot of minority 
contractors and neighborhood groups that depended on these funds. Id. 
 153. Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 503 F.2d at 930; see supra Part III.C.1 (discussing 
the Shannon litigation). 
 154. Gautreaux, 503 F.2d at 938. 
 155. Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284, 301-02 (1976); see Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 
503 F.2d at 937 (quoting then-HUD secretary George Romney as stating: “The impact of the 
concentration of the poor and minorities in the central city extends beyond the city boundaries to 
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After remand and years of gridlock in forging a remedy, the 
Gautreaux parties compromised and decided on a distribution scheme 
for newly placed, city-only public housing.  One-third of the units 
could be placed in racially segregated areas,156 one-third of the units 
would be placed in largely white areas,157 and another third would be 
placed in what the parties defined as “revitalizing areas” or “areas 
which have substantial minority populations and are undergoing 
sufficient redevelopment to justify the assumption that these areas 
will become more integrated in a relatively short time.”158  The 
approving district court defined revitalizing areas as those areas that 
were seeing increased development, were in an advantageous location, 
and were not areas of minority concentration.159  The plaintiffs, to 
achieve some progress, consented to locating some units in areas close 
to moderate-to-high poverty neighborhoods because they showed 
indicia of revitalizing and, therefore, a hope for economic integration, 
in the short run, and (perhaps) racial integration in the long run.160  
3.  Regulatory Codifications of Shannon and Gautreaux 
In response to Shannon and Gautreaux, HUD promulgated 
siting regulations for construction of new public housing, Section 8 
new construction, and senior housing.161  The regulation  set out 
various requirements for sites, crucially prohibiting new construction 
in “an area of minority concentration.”162  In addition, the regulation 
prohibited the siting of projects in neighborhoods of high poverty 
concentration, 163 resegregating neighborhoods,164 neighborhoods 
 
include the surrounding community . . . . To solve problems of the real city only metropolitan 
wide solutions will do.”). 
 156. Gautreaux v. Landrieu, 523 F. Supp. 665, 680 (N.D. Ill. 1981). 
 157. Id. 
 158. Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 304 F. Supp. 736, 737 (N.D. Ill. 1969). 
 159. An area may be designated as a Revitalizing Area if it is: 
1) undergoing visible redevelopment or evidences impending construction; 2) located 
along the lakefront, 3) scheduled to receive Community Development Block Grant 
Funds; 4) accessible to good transportation; 5) an area with a significant number of 
buildings already up to code standards; 6) accessible to good shopping; 7) located near 
attractive features, such as the lake or downtown; 8) free of an excessive 
concentration of assisted housing; 9) located in an area which is not entirely or 
predominantly in a minority area and 10) not densely populated. 
Gautreaux, 523 F. Supp. at 671. 
 160. Polikoff E-mail, supra note 152. 
 161. Vernarelli, supra note 132, at 219; see Bus. Ass’n of Univ. City v. Landrieu, 660 F.2d 
867, 869 (3d Cir. 1981) (discussing HUD regulations as partially in response to Shannon). 
 162. 24 C.F.R. § 941.202(c)(1)(i) (2005). 
 163. See id. § 941.202(d) (“The site must . . . avoid undue concentration of assisted persons in 
areas containing a high proportion of low-income persons.”) 
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detrimental to family life,165 those with urban blight,166 and those 
without access to basic, decent public facilities and services,167 or 
reasonable proximity to jobs.168  Although all these conditions tend to 
coexist, the regulatory scheme specifies them as independent 
prohibitions, requiring that each needs to be observed before new 
construction of federally subsidized low-income housing can 
commence. 
The regulation sets out two exceptions to the general 
prohibition on locating public housing in areas of minority 
concentration.  Housing can be sited in areas of minority 
concentration if there are 1) “sufficient, comparable opportunities . . . 
outside areas of minority concentration” or 2) “the project is necessary 
to meet overriding housing needs which cannot otherwise feasibly be 
met in that housing market area.”169  Echoing Gautreaux, the 
regulations explicitly recognize that discriminatory resistance—
presumably by white suburbanites—is not a sufficient reason for 
focusing on low-income neighborhoods.170  Similar to the Shannon 
court, the regulations also hedged their bets by including language 
that discussed sufficient comparable choices and overriding needs.171   
D.  Constitutional Limits on Title VIII Remedies 
All race-based governmental actions, including those that 
burden only whites, are subject to strict scrutiny.172  Such 
classifications “are constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored to 
further compelling governmental interests.”173 
 
 164. See id. § 941.202(c)(ii) (prohibiting siting in “[a] racially mixed area if the project will 
cause a significant increase in the proportion of minority to non-minority residents in the area”). 
 165. Id. § 941.202(e). 
 166. See id. (prohibiting siting where “substandard dwellings or other undesirable elements 
predominate”). Siting in such areas is acceptable only if there is a “concerted program to remedy 
the undesirable conditions.” Id. 
 167. Id. § 941.202(g). 
 168. See id. § 941.202(h) (“Travel time and cost . . . from the neighborhood to places of 
employment providing a range of jobs for low-income workers, must not be excessive.). 
 169. Id. § 941.202(c)(1)(i). 
 170. See id. (noting that the “overriding need” exception cannot be threat of racial 
discrimination). 
 171. Id. 
 172. City of Richmond v. J.A. Crosson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 494 (1989); Adarand Constructors, 
Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995). 
 173. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003). 
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1.  Integration as a Compelling Governmental Interest 
Several courts have suggested that ending racial segregation 
and furthering residential integration are compelling governmental 
interests.  The Supreme Court has recognized the benefits of 
integration, specifically integrated housing.174  In Otero v. New York 
City Housing Authority, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
upheld the housing authority’s decision to accord a preference to white 
applicants for a newly constructed housing project on New York City’s 
Lower East Side, in contravention of the authority’s own regulation 
giving first priority to present and former occupants of the urban 
renewal site upon which the project was constructed.175  Plaintiffs, 
mostly non-white former site occupants, argued that the preference for 
white applicants for the new housing project violated both Title VIII 
and the Civil Rights Act of 1964.176 
The Second Circuit accorded precedence to Title VIII’s duty to 
integrate over its prohibition of discrimination.  The court held that 
“increasing or maintaining racially segregated housing patterns 
merely because minority groups will gain an immediate benefit would 
render such persons willing, and perhaps unwitting, partners in the 
trend toward ghettoization of our urban centers.”177  The Second 
Circuit remanded the case to the district court to determine whether 
concentration of non-white residents in the new project would have 
the “tipping effect” the housing authority was attempting to prevent.  
The court indicated that if such a tipping effect were found, 
preventing it would be a sufficiently compelling interest to render the 
denial of housing to non-white applicants constitutionally 
permissible.178  The court noted that such discrimination would be 
permissible if “[evidence exists] that a color-blind adherence to [a 
housing authority regulation] would almost surely lead to eventual 
destruction of the racial integration that presently exists in the 
community.”179 
 
 174. Linmark Assocs. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 94-95 (1977) (citing 
Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972)). 
 175. Otero v. New York City Hous. Auth., 484 F.2d 1122, 1125-25 (2d Cir. 1973). The 
authority’s justification for giving priority to white applicants was to avoid turning the new 
project into “a non-white ‘pocket ghetto’ that would operate as a racial ‘tipping factor’ causing 
white residents to take flight and leading eventually to non-white ghettoization of the 
community.” Id. at 1124. 
 176. Id. at 1126-27. The plaintiffs conceded (and the court agreed) that the housing authority 
had a duty to further integration under § 3608 of Title VIII. Id. at 1133-34. 
 177. Id. at 1134. 
 178. Id. at 1124. 
 179. Id. at 1136. 
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2.  Integration and Narrow Tailoring 
Several courts have found that rigid racial quotas, made 
without reference to empirical studies of tipping, that have a 
discriminatory effect do not satisfy the constitutional “narrowly 
tailored” requirement.180  Courts have also found that such quotas can 
violate the Title VIII prohibition against racial discrimination in 
housing.181  Most recently, the Fifth Circuit, in Walker v. City of 
Mesquite,182 vacated a district court remedial order in a case in which 
HUD, the Dallas Housing Authority, and the City of Dallas had been 
found liable for unconstitutional racial discrimination and segregation 
in Dallas’s public housing programs.183  The district court’s order in 
that case provided for the demolition of more than 2,600 public 
housing units in West Dallas and the development of more than 2,800 
replacement units through both new construction and Section 8 
vouchers.  All new units were to be developed in “predominantly 
white” areas “until there are as many units in predominantly white 
areas as there are in minority areas.”184 
White homeowners sued185 to enjoin the construction of two 40-
unit public housing projects in their neighborhood, claiming violation 
of the Equal Protection Clause because the location was selected on 
the basis of their race.  The circuit court vacated the provision of the 
remedial order that directed the construction of new public housing 
units in predominantly white Dallas neighborhoods.186  The court 
applied strict scrutiny after determining that the contested provision 
constituted a “race-conscious remedial measure.”187  The court then 
ruled that the order directing new construction of public housing in 
predominantly white areas was not narrowly tailored to remedy past 
 
 180. E.g., Jaimes v. Lucas Metro. Hous. Auth., 833 F.2d 1203, 1207 (6th Cir. 1987); Burney 
v. Hous. Auth. of Beaver, 551 F. Supp. 746, 758 (W.D. Penn. 1982). 
 181. E.g., United States v. Starrett City Assocs., 840 F.2d 1096, 1100-01 (2d Cir. 1988); 
United States v. Charlottesville Redevelopment & Hous. Auth., 718 F. Supp. 461 (W.D. Va. 
1989). 
 182. Walker v. Mesquite, 169 F.3d 973, 975 (5th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1131 
(2000). Walker was a response to the historical discrimination against minorities by the Dallas 
Housing Authority. Id. 
 183. Id. at 975-76. 
 184. Id. at 977. “Predominantly white area” was defined as “less than 37% Hispanic, black or 
other minority.” Id. at 977-78. 
 185. The court gave a brief defense of its grant of standing to the white homeowners. Id. at 
978-81. While being selected on the basis of race served as a concrete injury, the court went 
further to hold that living near public housing itself is a sufficient injury for standing. Id. 
 186. Id. at 975-76. 
 187. Id. at 982. 
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discrimination.188  It would, however, allow for non-race-based 
solutions directing development of subsidized housing in, for example, 
low-poverty areas.189  The housing was eventually constructed in areas 
which were very similar to the initial planned sites.190 
IV. TAX CREDITS, HOUSING POLICY, AND SEGREGATION 
A.  Federal Housing Policy Before the Tax Credit 
When the Fair Housing Act was passed––and when federal 
courts and HUD initially interpreted it––almost all federal housing 
subsidies for construction were distributed by HUD or the Department 
of Agriculture.191  Though the federal government has long funded the 
construction of low-income housing with direct subsidies,192 
construction peaked in the late 1960s and early 1970s.193  In 1973, 
President Nixon issued a moratorium on virtually all large scale, 
federally subsidized public housing projects.194  Public housing 
construction declined dramatically over the next few years, as only 
those projects in the pipeline prior to the moratorium were 
completed.195  The primary low-income housing program from 1974 to 
1983 was Project-based Section 8, under which HUD provided 
assistance to public housing authorities and private owners for twenty 
to forty years after construction or substantial rehabilitation of low-
 
 188. Id. at 983 (“First, Section 8 housing vouchers have not been given a fair try to prove 
their potential to desegregate. Second, other criteria than a racial standard will ensure the 
desegregated construction or acquisition of any new public housing.”). The court approved the 
use of a site-selection criterion that all new sites be in areas where the poverty rate does not 
exceed 13%, even while noting that it had been suggested that this criterion would essentially 
restrict new construction to predominantly white areas. Id. at 985 & n.31. 
 189. Id. at 985. 
 190. The agencies proceeded to build the public housing based on nonracial data but were 
again challenged by the white homeowners, who argued this time that the projects were 
“tainted” by the past order to build in white areas. See generally Walker v. HUD, 326 F. Supp. 2d 
780, 786 (N.D. Tex. 2004). The Fifth Circuit did not entertain their challenge. Walker v. City of 
Mesquite, 402 F.3d 532 (5th Cir. 2005) (holding decision to build was not based on racial 
discrimination and not traceable to prior decision made with impermissible racial data). 
 191. Chester Hartman, Housing Policies Under the Reagan Administration, in CRITICAL 
PERSPECTIVES ON HOUSING 362, 362-64 (Rachel G. Bratt et al. eds., 1986). 
 192. See, e.g., U.S. Housing Act of 1937, ch. 896, 50 Stat. 888 (1937) (early example of direct 
federal low-income housing subsidies). 
 193. BARRY G. JACOBS ET AL., GUIDE TO FEDERAL HOUSING PROGRAMS 20-21 (2d ed. 1986). 
 194. Id. at 21. 
 195. Hartman, supra note 191, at 364. 
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income rental units.196  During the nine years it was in effect, Project-
based Section 8 produced over 750,000 new or substantially renovated 
subsidized housing units, an average of about 83,000 per year, many 
of which still function as low-income housing today.197 HUD was 
required to collect race data for all public housing and Section 8 
programs.198 
B.  How the Tax Credit Works 
Responding to increased demand for low-income housing and a 
series of HUD scandals,199 Congress almost entirely replaced direct 
subsidies for housing with the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit 
(“LIHTC”) program in 1986, administered by the Internal Revenue 
Service at the Department of the Treasury.200  The tax credit program 
allows owners of residential rental property to claim tax credits–– 
usually for ten years––for 30 percent to 70 percent of the present 
value of new and substantially rehabilitated housing developments.201  
Generally, a project qualifies for the credit only if, for a period of 
fifteen years, the property owner rents at least 20 percent of the units 
to households with incomes at or below 50 percent of the area median 
gross income, or the property owner rents at least 40 percent of the 
units to households with incomes at or below 60 percent of the area 
median gross income.202 
 
 196. Kevin M. Cremin, The Transition to Section 8 Housing: Will the Elderly Be Left 
Behind?, 18 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 405, 409 n.23, 411 (2000); NAT’L LOW INCOME HOUSING 
COALITION, 2004 ADVOCATES GUIDE TO HOUSING AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT POLICY 96 
(2004), available at http://www.nlihc.org/advocates/index.htm. 
 197. Cremin, supra note 196, at 409 n.23. 
 198. Roisman, supra note 2, at 1044-45. 
 199. See supra notes 149-171 and accompanying text (discussing role of HUD in the 
Gautreaux litigation); supra notes 144-148 and accompanying text (discussing role of HUD in 
housing discrimination in Boston); see also Michael Winerip, H.U.D. Scandal’s Lesson: It’s a 
Long Road From Revelation to Resolution, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 1990, at 20 (discussing the role of 
HUD in housing discrimination in New York City). 
 200. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 252, 100 Stat. 2095, 2189-2208 (1986); see 
Thomas R. Wechter & Daniel L. Kraus, The Internal Revenue Code’s Housing Program: Section 
42, 44 TAX LAW. 375, 375 (1991). Compare Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for 
Implementing Government Policy: A Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARV. 
L. REV. 705 (1970) (arguing that tax incentives are generally inferior to direct subsidies as a 
means of achieving social goals), with Edward A. Zelinsky, James Madison and Public Choice at 
Gucci Gulch: A Procedural Defense of Tax Expenditures and Tax Institutions, 102 YALE L.J. 1165 
(1993) (arguing that tax incentives are more effective than direct expenditures due to tax 
institutions’ high levels of visibility and competitiveness). 
 201. 26 U.S.C. §§ 42(a), (b) (2005); see Roisman, supra note 2, at 1014. 
 202. 26 U.S.C. § 42(g)(1) (2005). 
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1.  Program Administration 
Implementation of the LIHTC program requires substantial 
state and/or local government oversight, and the credits must be 
“allocated pursuant to a qualified allocation plan of the housing credit 
agency which is approved by the governmental unit . . . of which such 
agency is a part.”203  Frequently, this agency is a state housing agency 
or a local government housing authority created by state law.  The 
qualified allocation plan [“QAP”] must be submitted to HUD for 
review as part of a state consolidated plan covering all Section 8 and 
public housing that receives federal funds.204 
Because tax credits only partially fund a development, the 
program also requires the participation of local developers to finance 
the construction of tax-credit developments.  Approximately one-third 
of new projects are completed by local non-profit community 
development corporations,205 sometimes several in a single part of a 
segregated city.206  These non-profit community development 
corporations collect the necessary funds and most often partner with 
private developers to build the actual housing.207 
2. Qualified Census Tracts 
The LIHTC program initially provided a higher tax credit to 
developers who sited housing developments in “qualified census 
tracts,” (“QCTs”),208 which are census tracts in which at least 50 
percent of the households have incomes of less than 60 percent of the 
area median income.209 In 2000, this funding bonus was supplemented 
by a statutory preference favoring projects in QCTs.210  A qualified 
allocation plan is defined as any plan: 
 
 203. Id. § 42(m)(1)(A)(i). 
 204. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, TAX CREDITS: OPPORTUNITIES TO IMPROVE OVERSIGHT 
OF THE LOW INCOME HOUSING PROGRAM 55-56 (1997) [hereinafter GAO REPORT]. 
 205. SANDRA NOLDEN ET AL., ABT ASSOCIATES, INC., UPDATING THE LOW INCOME HOUSING 
TAX CREDIT (LIHTC) DATABASE: PROJECTS PLACED IN SERVICE THROUGH 1999, EXECUTIVE 
SUMMARY ii (2002). 
 206. VIDAL, supra note 25, at 38. 
 207. Id. at 67. 
 208. The concept of QCTs appeared in a statute for the first time in H.R. 2319, a bill to 
amend the Internal Revenue Act of 1986 and improve the effectiveness of the tax credits. In the 
Senate, there was no debate on the qualified census tract provision. The Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act of 1989 added the first QCT provision to the tax credit law. Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, § 7108 (g), 103 Stat. 2106, 2314 (1989). 
 209. 26 U.S.C. § 42(d)(5)(C)(ii)(I) (2005). There was no debate or discussion in either chamber 
regarding this provision. 
 210. Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 132(b), 114 Stat. 2763, 
2763A:610 to 2763A:613 (2000) (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 42(m)(1)(B) (2005)). 
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(i) which sets forth selection criteria to be used to determine housing priorities of the 
housing credit agency which are appropriate to local conditions, 
(ii) which also gives preference in allocating housing credit dollar amounts among 
selected projects to—. . . 
(III) projects which are located in qualified census tracts . . . and the development of 
which contributes to a concerted community revitalization plan.211 
As with the initial statutory incentive, the adoption of the 
preference was not specifically debated, but simply incorporated as an 
amendment in a large budget bill.212 
C.  Tax Credit Data 
Since its inception in 1987, the LIHTC program “has been the 
principal mechanism for supporting the production of new and 
rehabilitated rental housing for low-income households,”213 accounting 
for 40 to 50 percent of the federal commitment to construction of low-
income or affordable housing.214  In 2004, the estimated total number 
of LIHTC units (1.3 million) had surpassed the combined product of all 
forms of public housing construction that had been subsidized by the 
federal government and subject to federal siting requirements.215  The 
tax credit program amounts to $5 billion per year in federal tax 
expenditures.  It is matched by hundreds of millions in state and local 
tax-exempt revenue bonds and philanthropy,216 and leveraged by 
 
 211. 26 U.S.C. § 42(m)(1)(B) (2005) (emphasis added). 
 212. The QCT preference was never discussed in recorded debates in Congress. No mention 
of it appears in any legislative debate, in any committee report, or in any newspaper article at 
the time. 
 213. SANDRA NOLDEN ET AL., ABT ASSOC., INC., UPDATING THE LOW INCOME HOUSING TAX 
CREDIT (LIHTC) DATABASE: PROJECTS PLACED IN SERVICE THROUGH 2000, at 2 (2002) 
[hereinafter ABT 2000 REPORT]. 
 214. SANDRA NOLDEN ET AL., ABT ASSOCS., INC., UPDATING THE LOW INCOME HOUSING TAX 
CREDIT DATABASE: PROJECTS PLACED IN SERVICE THROUGH 2001 (2003), available at 
http://www.huduser.org/Datasets/lihtc/report9501.pdf [hereinafter ABT 2001 REPORT]; DAVID A. 
SMITH ET AL., RECAPITALIZATION ADVISORS, INC., THE LOW-INCOME HOUSING TAX CREDIT 
EFFECTIVENESS AND EFFICIENCY 3 (2002). This does not include the federal commitment for 
voucher-based housing programs. 
 215. Khadduri, supra note 2, at 1. The LIHTC now produces on average about 90,000 units a 
year, outpacing the average number of new units brought into construction per year under 
previous programs. Id. 
 216. LIHTCs: Supporting Affordable Housing Nationwide, http://www.nefinc.org/LIHTC/ 
LIHTChome.htm (last visited Nov. 20, 2005). The developers or sponsors of projects are then 
responsible for seeking out investors or a tax credit syndication fund (e.g., National Equity Fund, 
Inc., a large non-profit syndicator of affordable housing). Since its inception in 1987, National 
Equity has invested $3.8 billion in housing projects. National Equity Fund, Inc., An Investment 
Overview, http://www.nefinc.org/Investors/ExecutiveSummary.htm (last visited Nov. 20, 2005). 
In 2001, the organization invested $361 million in equity for projects across the country, and in 
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significant private investment.217 Since 1987, the “vast majority” of 
LIHTC developments have been low-income units.218 
In contrast to previous housing policy,219 the federal 
government has never collected racial impact data for the placement 
of LIHTC units.220  Since 1994, however, HUD has contracted with 
Abt Associates, Inc., to build a database containing information on the 
number and location of units, as well the characteristics of the 
applicant or user of the unit.221  A few states have also studied the 
relationship between siting and concentration of poor and minority 
tenants.222 
1.  National Placement Data 
In the early years of LIHTC developments, credits were often 
combined with other federal subsidies to existing projects, meaning 
that virtually all early LIHTC units were built in high-poverty 
areas.223  After the early years of the program, during which units 
were more likely to be placed in high poverty areas, the figure dropped 
to about 60 percent.224  Today, the concentration of tax credit projects 
in high poverty neighborhoods is most apparent in family units: two-
thirds are placed in neighborhoods of more than 10 percent poverty.225  
Evidence also shows that community development corporations are 
much more likely than private investors to site housing in areas with 
high minority concentrations and areas of concentrated poverty.226 
 
2003 it invested $102 million in projects in the Midwest. Midwest Regional Contacts and Project 
Information, http://www.nefinc.org/Developers/MidwestTeam.htm (last visited Nov. 20, 2005). 
 217. See OFFICE OF TAX EXEMPT BONDS, TAX-EXEMPT GOVERNMENTAL BONDS: COMPLIANCE 
GUIDE 2-8 (2003), available at http://www.novoco.com/IRS_Regulations/GovBond_Pub4079.pdf 
(discussing the basic framework of tax-exempt government bonds). Two examples of these 
subsidies are state and local tax-exempt bonds and Section 515 loans from the Rural Housing 
Service (RHS). ABT 2000 REPORT, supra note 213, at 12-13. 
 218. ABT 2001 REPORT, supra note 214, at 10. 
 219. See Roisman, supra note 2, at 1044-45 (describing the reporting requirements under 
Section 8 and other programs). 
 220. See Roisman, supra note 2, at 1012 (stating that the Treasury, an administrator of the 
LIHTC, “lack[s] information regarding the extent of discrimination or segregation in the 
program”). This differs if the LIHTC units are mixed with funds from HUD or the Department of 
Agriculture, which then explicitly requires that racial data is collected. Id. at 1038. 
 221. See ABT ASSOCS. INC., DEVELOPMENT AND ANALYSIS OF THE NATIONAL LOW-INCOME 
HOUSING TAX CREDIT: FINAL REPORT 1-4, 1-5 (1996) [hereinafter ABT 1996 REPORT]. 
 222. See infra Part IV.C.2 (discussing local placement data). 
 223. Khadduri, supra note 2, at 6. 
 224. Id. 
 225. Id. at 5. 
 226. ABT ASSOCS., INC., ASSESSMENT OF THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF 
LIHTC RESIDENTS AND NEIGHBORHOODS: FINAL REPORT, 4:16-4:18 (2000) [hereinafter ABT 
SOCIAL ASSESSMENT]. By definition, CDCs are often small and lack the resources to work beyond 
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The national distribution of LIHTC units in inner-city, 
suburban and non-metropolitan areas is similar to the distribution of 
rental units generally.227  LIHTC units, however, are more likely than 
other rental units to be located in census tracts where more than 60 
percent of households would qualify to live in a tax credit unit.228  Tax 
credit units are also more likely to be located in high-poverty areas, 
and in largely minority or rental occupied tracts with large 
proportions of female-headed households.229  National data also 
indicates that the placement of housing in urban, suburban, or rural 
areas has a significant effect on the racial and economic makeup of the 
site: city locations are associated with higher poverty and minority 
concentration.230 
Although LIHTC units are not found in as deeply segregated 
neighborhoods as other forms of assisted housing, recent scholarship 
finds that LIHTC neighborhoods nationally contain disproportionate 
shares of black and Latino residents and are places with increasing 
populations of blacks and Latinos.231  Analysis also shows that of the 
43 percent of units in neighborhoods with relatively low poverty, 25 
percent of the LIHTC family units with more than two bedrooms were 
in census tracts with more than 20 percent minority residents.232  
Given that racial transition begins in schools, resegregation of 
neighborhoods is quite possible if low-income minority families are 
concentrated there. It is possible, if not likely, that units made 
 
the narrow confines of a city neighborhood, much less participate in the necessary, strenuous 
efforts to enforce fair housing in hostile suburbs. Moreover, affluent communities have little need 
for CDCs. 
 227. ABT 2001 REPORT, supra note 214, at 23. Forty-eight percent of LIHTC units placed in 
service from 1995 through 2000 are in central cities, 38% are in suburbs, and 14% are in non-
metro areas. Id. Among rental units in general, 45.5% are in central cities, 39% are in suburbs, 
and 15.5% are in non-metro areas. Id. Another recent study of LIHTC units shows that 58% of 
such units are in central cities, and 42% are “in the suburbs,”—but there is no data 
distinguishing between stressed and affluent communities in this analysis. Id. at 29-35. The 
characteristics of a community (whether in a city or suburb) have profound consequences for the 
opportunities of people living there. See ORFIELD, supra note 46, at 28-49 (classifying different 
communities on factors including concentrations of jobs, school composition, and tax base). 
 228. ABT 2000 REPORT, supra note 213, at 29. 
 229. Id. 
 230. ABT SOCIAL ASSESSMENT, supra note 226, at 4-4. Thirty-one percent of LIHTC units in 
central city locations are in neighborhoods of concentrated poverty compared with only 4.7% in 
the suburbs and 9.9% in non-metro areas. Id. Over half of all units in central city locations are in 
neighborhoods with high minority concentrations compared with 28% in suburbs and 14.4% in 
non-metro areas. Id. at 4-24. 
 231. LANCE FREEMAN, CTR. ON URBAN AND METRO. POLICY, SITING AFFORDABLE HOUSING: 
LOCATION AND NEIGHBORHOOD TRENDS OF LOW-INCOME HOUSING TAX CREDIT DEVELOPMENTS IN 
THE 1990S 6-8 (2004), available at http://www.brookings.edu/urban/pubs/20040405_ 
Freemand.pdf. 
 232. Khadduri, supra note 2, at 8 ex. 5. 
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available in white neighborhoods only went to white, low-income 
tenants.233  We simply cannot say, because the state housing agency 
kept no racial or socioeconomic data, the basic minimal requirement of 
the FHA. 
Other data, although not collected specifically for the LIHTC, 
shows a relationship between site placement and racial composition.  
Without measures to overcome housing market discrimination, the 
placement of low-income units in the suburbs often causes 
segregation.  In New Jersey, where the Mount Laurel litigation led to 
the construction of a significant number of low-income units in the 
suburbs, few blacks or Latinos live in units built in white areas.234  In 
other HUD programs, non-whites have found it far harder than whites 
to use vouchers in white areas, even where racial data is kept and 
could be used to support civil rights claims.235 
2.  Local Placement Data 
Scholarship on metropolitan or statewide levels shows that 
different parts of the country deploy LIHTC units differently.  The 
Midwest and the Northeast, the most fragmented regions 
governmentally,236 have the highest likelihood of segregative 
placement, whereas the South and West have a much less fragmented 
pattern of local control and a less segregative pattern.237  Many parts 
 
 233. This likelihood is borne out by other programs which failed to consider race. See NAOMI 
BAILIN WISH & STEPHEN EISDORFER, THE IMPACT OF MT. LAUREL INITIATIVES: AN ANALYSIS OF 
THE CHARACTERISTICS OF APPLICANTS AND OCCUPANTS 68-76 (1996) (analyzing data collected by 
the New Jersey Affordable Housing Management Service). In the MTO experiments, race was 
not considered and many of the families who moved to low-income neighborhoods remained in 
extremely racially concentrated neighborhoods. U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. AND URBAN DEV., MOVING 
TO OPPORTUNITY FOR FAIR HOUSING DEMONSTRATION PROGRAM: INTERIM IMPACTS EVALUATION 
viii (2003). 
 234. WISH & EISDORFER, supra note 233, at 68-76. 
 235. Strengths and Weaknesses of the Housing Voucher Program: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. On Housing and Community Opportunity of the H. Comm. On Financial Services, 
108th Cong. (2003) (statement of Margery Austin Turner, Director, Metropolitan Housing and 
Communities Policy Center, The Urban Institute), available at http://www.urban.org 
/url.cfm?ID=900635; Emily Rosenbaum et al., New Places, New Faces: An Analysis of 
Neighborhoods and Social Ties Among MTO Movers in Chicago, in CHOOSING A BETTER LIFE?: 
EVALUATING THE MOVING OPPORTUNITY SOCIAL EXPERIMENT 275, 285-86 (John Goering & 
Judith D. Feins eds., 2003). 
 236. ORFIELD, supra note 46, at 131. 
 237. Khadduri, supra note 2, at 8-9. Other commentators have noted that much of the 
litigation and problem areas surrounding the tax credit come from New Jersey, Connecticut, and 
Massachusetts. See Philip D. Tegeler, The Persistence of Segregation in Government Housing 
Programs, in THE GEOGRAPHY OF OPPORTUNITY: RACE AND HOUSING CHOICE IN METROPOLITAN 
AMERICA 197, 202 (Xavier de Souza Briggs ed., 2005) (discussing housing trends based on the 
results of the first national study of the LIHTC by Abt Associates). 
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of the country, particularly the Southeast, suggest at least isolated 
examples of much less economically segregative placement.  
Nonetheless, even this placement could be far short of what is 
necessary to affirmatively further fair housing. 
Individual studies from several states in the Northeast show a 
relationship between LIHTC site placements and racial concentration.  
In Massachusetts, advocacy groups have documented the presence of 
widespread segregation of white residents from black and Hispanic 
residents in metropolitan areas and the difficulty that poor, minority 
families face in moving to more integrated communities with better 
housing.238  In Connecticut, the pattern is similar.239  In New Jersey, 
LIHTC family units are found more often in New Jersey’s large and 
distressed cities.  Nearly 60 percent of LIHTC family units in New 
Jersey are located in large central cities, and 21 percent are located in 
distressed suburban areas with less than 3 percent of units located in 
the state’s affluent municipalities.240 
Ironically, New Jersey tends to allocate most of its federal 
affordable housing funds to school districts that the federal 
government considers to be failing.  New Jersey cities with high 
concentrations of LIHTC units also have a disproportionate share of 
schools in need of improvement to attain No Child Left Behind 
standards.  For example, Newark, where most of the schools do not 
meet federal NCLB standards, has 21.3 percent of the LIHTC family 
units. Sixteen of the twenty-five schools in northern New Jersey 
counties with the highest concentration of students in poverty also 
have the highest allocation of tax credits.241  Qualified census tracts in 
New Jersey have higher poverty rates and a considerably higher 
concentration of minorities than other tracts.242 
 
 238. Letter from Judith Liben et al., Mass. Law Reform Inst., to Jane Gumble & Catherine 
Racer, Dep’t of Hous. and Cmty. Dev. 3-4 (Jan. 27, 2004), http://www.prrac.org/pdf/MA2004 
LawReform.pdf. 
 239. ABT 2001 REPORT, supra note 214, at 60, 63. 
 240. Amicus Brief on Behalf of the Institute of Race & Poverty and the Kirwan Institute for 
the Study of Race and Ethnicity at 33-35, In re Adoption of the 2002 Low Income Hous. Tax 
Credit Qualified Allocation Plan, No. A-10-02T2 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002) (dismissed) 
[hereinafter IRP Amicus Brief]. 
 241. Myron Orfield & Thomas Luce, NEW JERSEY METROPATTERNS: A REGIONAL AGENDA FOR 
COMMUNITY AND STABILITY IN NEW JERSEY 22 (2003), available at http://www.ameregis.com/ 
maps/region_maps/NJ%20Metropatterns%20complete%2003_24_03.pdf. 
 242. E-mail from Eric Myott, Staff Member, Institute on Race and Poverty, to Myron Orfield, 
Director, Institute on Race and Poverty (June 24, 2004, 10:08:55 CST) (on file with author). As of 
2004, there are 285 QCTs in New Jersey. Id. QCTs have a tract poverty rate average of 28.82% 
compared to 6.18% for the rest of New Jersey tracts. Id. Only 28 QCTs have populations of less 
than 30 percent black and Hispanic and only 11 are located more than a mile away from tracts 
with 30 percent or more black and Hispanic populations. Id. Most QCTs with low black/Hispanic 
populations are located outside metropolitan areas. Id. 
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V. CASE STUDY: APPLYING FAIR HOUSING TO TAX CREDITS IN NEW 
JERSEY 
A.  Overview 
In 2002 and 2003, the New Jersey Housing and Mortgage 
Finance Agency (“HMFA”) proposed qualified allocation plans which 
critics argued would funnel tax credits into primarily segregated city 
neighborhoods.243  The Agency’s previous allocations had concentrated 
LIHTC units in New Jersey’s large and distressed cities.244  
Allocations were high for segregated areas like Newark, Plainfield, 
and Camden,245 which was recently found to be the most dangerous 
city in the country.246  In a striking parallel to the Gautreaux case, 
Camden officials are implementing a vast redevelopment plan that 
will destroy thousands of existing affordable housing units around the 
central business district and use LIHTC credits to rebuild housing a 
few miles away for a portion of those displaced.247  Cities where 
projects received a high number of tax credits typically had low tax 
bases, declining employment opportunities, and segregated schools.248 
B.  The Spectrum of Parties and Positions 
1.  Regionalists: Fair Share Housing Center 
Fair Share Housing Center (“Fair Share”) is a non-profit 
community development corporation that builds low-income housing 
 
 243. In re Adoption of the 2003 Low Income Hous. Tax Credit Qualified Allocation Plan, 848 
A.2d 1, 5-6, 9 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004); see Brief of Appellant, In re Adoption of the 2002 
Low Income Housing Tax Credit Allocation Plan, No. A-10-02T2 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003) 
(dismissed) [hereinafter Appellants’ Brief] (HMFA regulations “guaranteed that three-quarters 
of tax credit funding would be used to construct housing in racially segregated neighborhood 
with racially-segregated schools”). 
 244. Appellants’ Brief, supra note 243, at 2. 
 245. Id. at 9. 
 246. Id.; Press Release, Morgan Quinto Press, City Crime Rankings Names Newton, 
Massachusetts as America’s Safest City, NJ Ranks as Most Dangerous (Nov. 22, 2004), 
http://www.morganquinto.com/safecity.htm. 
 247. Jill P. Capuzzo, Camden’s Billion-Dollar Gamble, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2004, at 14NJ. 
This vast effort has spawned a race to the bottom as frightened inner-ring suburbs of Camden 
are planning the demolition of existing units of affordable housing to prevent a rapidly rolling 
pattern of resegregation and decline. HOWARD GILLETTE, CAMDEN (forthcoming) (Ch. 10 
manuscript at 30-32, on file with author). The plan enjoys the support of prominent CDC leader 
Jeremy Nowak and many of the active developers in the CDC community are involved. Id. 
 248. IRP Amicus Brief, supra note 240, at 33-41; In re 2003, 848 A.2d at 5, 10. 
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in the cities and suburbs of New Jersey.  Frustrated that state 
allocation of tax credits disproportionately favors central cities, Fair 
Share, the Camden County and Southern Burlington County 
NAACPs,249 and the Camden City Taxpayers Association challenged 
the HMFA’s method for allocating credits as set out in its qualified 
allocation plans.250  Fair Share sought to include in the record data 
obtained through the New Jersey Public Records Act that showed that 
the LIHTC funding supported segregation in housing for families, but 
the motion was denied on procedural grounds.251  Because of the lack 
of complete data, particularly any data regarding the tenants, the core 
of the plaintiffs’ arguments was based on their claim that by allocating 
tax credits without collecting the residents’ racial data, HMFA 
violated its duty to affirmatively further fair housing under Title VIII. 
Specifically, the plaintiffs argued that the FHA, an executive 
order, and case law supported applying the duty to promote fair 
housing to the IRS252 and that the duty applied to the HMFA via FHA 
regulations.253  Because the agency did not consider the segregative 
impact of its allocation, Fair Share argued that the regulations should 
be set aside.254  It countered the argument that the HMFA was merely 
following the QCT preference by noting that the HMFA ignored both 
other preferences of the same statute and the additional requirement 
that placements in QCTs include “a concerted community 
revitalization plan.”255  The plaintiffs further argued that the HMFA’s 
plan violated its Title VIII duty through intentional discrimination or, 
alternately, disparate impact discrimination.256  Although the 
plaintiffs urged that the regulation be reversed, an alternative 
allocation method was never fully spelled out; the brief, however, 
 
 249. The NAACP chapters, as well as counsel Peter O’Connor, brought the landmark Mt. 
Laurel cases, in which the New Jersey Supreme Court found that suburban exclusionary zoning 
violated the General Welfare Clause of the New Jersey Constitution. S. Burlington County 
NAACP v. Twp of Mt. Laurel, 336 A.2d 713, 713-15, 725, 730 (N.J. 1975); S. Burlington County 
NAACP v. Twp of Mt. Laurel, 456 A.2d 390, 390, 407  (N.J. 1983). See generally DAVID L. KIRP ET 
AL., OUR TOWN: RACE, HOUSING, AND THE SOUL OF SUBURBIA (1995) (discussing the Mt. Laurel 
litigation). 
 250. In re 2003, 848 A.2d at 5, 10. Though the 2002 QAP was the initial focus of the 
litigation, the parties eventually agreed to base the challenge on the 2003 QAP, which is the 
focus of the court’s decision. Id. at 6. 
 251. Appellants’ Brief, supra note 243, at 16. 
 252. Id. at 28-37; see supra Part III.C.3 (discussing applicable regulations and Shannon). 
 253. Appellants’ Brief, supra note 243, at 37-42; see supra Part III.C.3 (discussing applicable 
regulations). 
 254. Appellants’ Brief, supra note 243, at 50. The appellants also argued that the agency 
violated state constitutional provisions regarding education, id. at 50-56, and general welfare, id. 
at 56-64. 
 255. Id. at 42; 26 U.S.C. § 42(m)(1)(B)(ii)(III) (2005). 
 256. Appellants’ Brief, supra note 243, at 64-72. 
  
140 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. XX:N:nnn 
strongly suggested that HUD siting rules should govern the placement 
of credits.257 
Fair Share, though isolated by the community development 
corporation movement and city leaders, enjoyed strong support from 
some activists and politicians.  Pennsauken’s black mayor, Rick 
Taylor, who worked hard to keep his suburb from experiencing rapid 
racial change, supported Fair Share’s position.258  Daryl Armstrong, a 
black minister and leader of the New Jersey Regional Equity 
Coalition, announced his support, basing it on his own experience 
growing up in a segregated neighborhood and the desire for an 
integrated society.259  Fair Share was also supported by amici from the 
Lawyer’s Committee for Civil Rights Under Law260 and two other 
institutes which study race and poverty.261  In their brief, the 
institutes argued that the HMFA must take into account race in 
allocating credits,262 disputed the claim that LIHTC allocations 
revitalize poor communities,263 and set out the harms of concentrated 
poverty and racial isolation.264 
2.  Localist Community Development Perspective: The HMFA and 
LISC 
The defendant Housing and Mortgage Finance Agency, a part 
of the state’s Department of Community Affairs,265 took a hard-line 
 
 257. Id. 
 258. GILLETTE, supra note 247, at 30-32. Pennsauken is one of few New Jersey areas which 
is racially mixed. See Susan Warner, Visions of Another Trendy Enclave, N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 26, 
2004, at 1. 
 259. Daryl Armstrong, Address at the South Jersey Regional Equity Summit, St. Anthony of 
Padua Roman Catholic Church, Hightstown, N.J. (June 21, 2004) (personally attended by 
author). 
 260. See generally Brief in Support of Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law’s 
Motion for Leave to Appear as Amicus Curiae and on the Merits, In re Adoption of the 2002 Low 
Income Housing Tax Credit Allocation Plan, No. A-10-02T2 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003) 
(dismissed). 
 261. See generally IRP Amicus Brief, supra note 240 (noting the involvement of two other 
research institutes). 
 262. IRP Amicus Brief, supra note 240, at 4-9. The brief argued that the Supreme Court’s 
recent decision in Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, provides several reasons that a race-
conscious QAP would survive strict scrutiny. Id. at 13-15. 
 263. Id. at 33-39. 
 264. Id. at 20-27. 
 265. The head of the DCA, Susan Bass Levin, defended the QAP to the press. Bill Duhart, 
Lawsuit Holding Up Housing, COURIER-POST (Cherry Hill, N.J.), Nov. 17, 2003, at 1G. As with 
the plaintiffs, the individuals on the state’s side had connections with the Mt. Laurel litigation. 
Notably, one of the toughest and most successful housing battles fought by Peter O’Connor and 
Fair Share was in the suburbs of Cherry Hill, where Levin was mayor. See Fair Share Hous. 
Ctr., Inc. v. Twp. of Cherry Hill, 802 A.2d 512 (2002). Both Levin and former Governor Jim 
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position against Fair Share’s challenge.  It argued both that its QAP 
struck an appropriate balance between urban and suburban affordable 
housing and that Title VIII imposed no obligations regarding racial 
and economic segregation.  HMFA argued that it should not be bound 
by HUD siting requirements because no federal agency has expressly 
required that the tax credit program be so bound and because it had 
no direct control of the siting of projects.266  The Agency also argued 
that it did not need to comply with the FHA’s affirmative duty because 
doing so would conflict with its duty to promote urban revitalization 
and that a plan which took into account race would violate Supreme 
Court case law on race-based remedies.267  Finally, it contended that 
fair housing goals were met in the 2003 QAP through a restructuring 
of its funding cycles which abolished the city-suburb distinction and 
adopted measures favoring mixed-income housing.268 
The HMFA’s position was supported by central city politicians, 
bureaucrats, and developers. Local Initiatives Support Corporation 
(“LISC”),269a huge community development intermediary which assists 
communities in developing affordable spaces,270filed an amicus brief. 
In the brief, LISC argued that the creation of affordable housing in 
urban neighborhoods is crucial to revitalizing those communities.271  
 
McGreevey, as mayor of Woodbridge, fought the construction of low income housing in their 
municipalities. Allan Malach, The Betrayal of Mount Laurel, SHELTERFORCE ONLINE, Mar./Apr. 
2004, http://www.nhi.org/online/issues/134/mtlaurel.html. A 2001 report showed that 
Woodbridge and Cherry Hill each should have produced a fair share of over 1,300 units each and 
had not produced any. Id. 
 266. In re Adoption of the 2003 Low Income Hous. Tax Credit Qualified Allocation Plan, 848 
A.2d 1, 14 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004); Brief and Appendix of Respondent New Jersey 
Housing and Mortgage Finance Authority at 16, In re 2002 Low Income Housing Tax Credit 
Qualified Allocation Plan, No. A-10-02T2 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003) (dismissed) 
[hereinafter Brief of Respondent]. 
 267. Brief of Respondent, supra note 266, at 27, 36-37. It distinguished previous cases, like 
Shannon and Otero, largely by arguing that “times have changed significantly.” Id. at 41. While 
this last point was not strongly asserted, it was strategically very threatening for fair housing 
groups that a Democratic administration would assert this type of claim, which has been more 
closely associated with colorblind ideological conservatives. In the context of a federal judiciary 
increasingly adverse to race conscious claims, the Democratic administration of New Jersey was 
providing cover to a decision which could gut the Fair Housing Act. The harshness of this 
position by the state spurned civil rights amici from all over the nation. 
 268. See In re 2003, 848 A.2d at 9-10. 
 269. See Amicus Curiae Brief on Behalf of Local Initiatives Support Corporation, In re 
Adoption of the 2002 Low Income Hous. Tax Credit Qualified Allocation Plan, No. A-10-02T2 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003) (dismissed) [hereinafter Local Initiatives Amicus Brief]. 
 270. LOC. INITIATIVES SUPPORT CORP., 2003 ANNUAL REPORT, available at 
http://www.lisc.org/whatsnew/documents/ 2003ar_webversion.pdf.  Since 1980, LISC claims to 
have spent almost $13 billion in these efforts and to have produced nearly 150,000 affordable 
homes. Id. 
 271. Local Initiatives Amicus Brief, supra note 269, at 13-14; see Jeremy Nowak, President 
and CEO, The Reinvestment Fund, Urban Redevelopment Testimony, 35 N.J. Reg. 3298(b) app. 
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After a decade of construction of affordable housing in Newark, LISC 
argued that crime decreased, building permits increased, and housing 
prices rose.272  The LISC brief cites case studies of four cities, finding 
that affordable housing opportunities are associated with increases in 
home prices and in some cases, increased commercial activity and a 
decline in crime.273 
The LISC brief did not address the racial effects of the HMFA’s 
policies or effects on educational opportunities and did not provide 
specific data on job creation in New Jersey.274 
3.  Middle Ground: The New Jersey Institute for Social Justice 
The New Jersey Institute for Social Justice headed a group of 
organizations with conflicted loyalties; they advocate civil rights but 
also depend on status quo programs.  The Institute argued that, while 
federal and state civil rights laws do apply to the LIHTC, most low-
income housing should still be built in poor neighborhoods.  The 
Institute’s position acknowledged both the dire problem of segregation 
and the importance and effectiveness of community revitalization.275  
Citing many of the same cases as the Fair Share plaintiffs, the amicus 
brief stated that “an unbroken string of court decisions have held that 
the Fair Housing Act’s ‘affirmatively furthering’ requirement applies 
to state and local agencies using federal funds,”276 and thus, it applied 
to the HMFA.277  The brief argued that racial integration should be 
“one major criterion” in determining a QAP but that the QCT 
preference should also be a factor.  The brief further contended that 
although suburban sites should be high on the priority list, urban sites 
should retain the majority of tax credits.278  Implicit in the Institute’s 
position is the argument that integration has been difficult, if not 
impossible, to accomplish, and thus societal change should be slow and 
incremental.  The Institute for Social Justice brief may be a testament 
 
VII (Jun. 14, 2003) [hereinafter Nowak Testimony] (“Subsidy allocation can lead market rate 
developments, if done in a careful manner.”). 
 272. Local Initiatives Amicus Brief, supra note 269, at 19-20. 
 273. Id. at 14-16. 
 274. In fact, many of the cities receiving the highest LIHTC allocations had double digit 
losses in private sector jobs, during a period of strong growth. IRP Amicus Brief, supra note 240, 
at 35. 
 275. Brief in Support of New Jersey Institute for Social Justice’s Motion to Appear as Amici 
Curiae and on the Merits at 1-2, In re Adoption of the 2002 Low Income Hous. Tax Credit, No. A-
10-02T2 (N.J. Super Ct. App. Div. 2003) (dismissed) [hereinafter N.J. Inst. For Social Justice 
Brief]. 
 276. Id. at 21-23. 
 277. Id. at 23-25. 
 278. Id. at 31-33. 
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to the difficult position that many established community 
development practitioners have with changing a status quo upon 
which their organizations depend. 
C.  The Decision of the Appellate Court 
In In re 2003, the appellate court affirmed the legality of the 
HMFA’s qualified allocation plan.279  The court ruled that, although 
the Agency had a duty to administer the tax credit program in a 
manner that affirmatively furthers the purposes of Title VIII, the duty 
had to be defined as congruent with other provisions of federal and 
state housing law.280  Specifically, the court held that integration was, 
at most, a “desirable by-product” of the HMFA’s statutory mission to 
provide housing and redevelopment and that the federal statutory 
preference for funding qualified census tracts required the agency to 
focus on non-racial criteria.281  With this notion of the Agency’s duty, 
the court rejected the claim that the QAP violated HMFA’s duty to 
affirmatively further fair housing under Title VIII.282  The court held 
that the plan appropriately reconciled the state and federal statutory 
directive to give priority to projects located in high-poverty, 
community revitalization areas with the Title VIII duty.283  The 
balancing approach used in the In re 2003 decision most closely 
resembles the one proposed by the New Jersey Institute for Social 
Justice amicus brief, albeit with greater weight given to the QCT 
preference. 
After upholding use of the QAP, the court noted in dicta that if  
the HMFA had structured its allocation plan so as to foster integration 
by allocating tax credits to developments in predominantly white 
communities, it might subject itself to claims that this race-based 
selection criteria violated the Equal Protection Clause.284  The court 
suggested that central-city mayors or urban-area developers might 
argue that race-based selection criteria favoring suburban 
 
 279. In re Adoption of the 2003 Low Income Hous. Tax Credit Qualified Allocation Plan, 848 
A.2d 1, 9 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004). 
 280. Id. 
 281. Id. at 25-26. 
 282. Id. at 9; 42 U.S.C. § 3608(d) (2005). 
 283. In re 2003, 848 A.2d at 19-22. The court also ruled that the QAP did not violate Title 
VIII by having a substantial discriminatory effect, and that it did not violate the state or federal 
equal protection clauses, the Mount Laurel doctrine, or the state Law Against Discrimination. 
Id. at 25-26. 
 284. Id. at 17-18 (citing Walker v. City of Mesquite, 169 F.3d 973 (5th Cir. 1999)). 
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development violated the Equal Protection Clause by discriminating 
against racial minorities.285 
 
VI.  RECONCILING FAIR HOUSING AND THE LOW INCOME HOUSING TAX 
CREDIT 
 
The In Re 2003 court reiterated what is clear from legislative 
history, case law, and administrative materials: the duty to 
affirmatively further integrated housing applies to all federal housing 
programs,286 including the LIHTC.287 Although agencies administering 
the program are bound by the duty,288 substantial disagreement 
remains as to the scope of that duty and its importance in relation to 
other statutory commands.  When another priority carries the weight 
of a statutory or regulatory enactment, an agency could 
understandably construe the nature of the Title VIII duty narrowly or 
engage in its own balancing test.  The special importance and history 
of civil rights law require that the fair housing duty be considered 
before all others and that the regulations be applied broadly to cover 
the LIHTC program. 
A.  The Fair Housing Duty Must Be Accorded Priority over the QCT 
Preference 
1.  Special Rules for Interpretation of Civil Rights Statutes Require 
 Prioritizing the Title VIII Duty 
Courts generally construe remedial statutes broadly, so as to 
give effect to their purposes.289  The Supreme Court held in Trafficante 
v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. that the language of Title VIII 
 
 285. In re 2003, 848 A.2d at 18. 
 286. Local Initiatives Amicus Brief, supra note 269, at 20; see Albany Apartments Tenants 
Assoc. v. Veneman, No. Civ. 01-1976, 2003 WL 1571576 at *10-11 (D. Minn. Mar. 11, 2003) 
(Department of Agriculture program); Jones v. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, 983 
F.Supp. 197, 204 (D.D.C 1997) (Office of Comptroller of the Currency program). 
 287. In re 2003, 848 A.2d at 21-22. 
 288. Clearly, the IRS is an executive agency administering a program relating to housing, 
particularly within the parenthetical language in the statute applying the duty to federal 
agencies having supervisory authority of financial institutions. 42 U.S.C. § 3608(d) (2005). 
Housing finance agencies, as distributors of mortgage funds and home building funds are also 
covered under this statute. See generally Otero v. New York City Hous. Auth., 484 F.2d 1122 
(1973); 26 C.F.R. § 1.42-9(a) (2005). 
 289. Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967). 
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should be construed broadly and inclusively.290  The Court, citing the 
testimony of one of the FHA’s authors, Walter Mondale, noted “the 
reach of [the Act] was to replace the ghettos ‘by truly integrated and 
balanced living patterns.’”291  The Court went on to hold that vitality 
could be given to this policy “only by a generous construction” of the 
Act’s provision establishing private citizens’ standing to sue for 
enforcement of the Act.292  Conversely, courts have held that 
exceptions to remedial statutes, and the FHA in particular, should be 
construed narrowly.293  Minimally, this broad construction requires 
that the Title VIII duty be accorded great weight.  Given the immense 
segregative impact of locating housing in poor neighborhoods, a 
reading consistent with Trafficante would require that the duty to 
further integration be considered before any other. 
2.  Supremacy Clause Jurisprudence Requires Prioritizing the Title 
VIII Duty over the QCT Preference 
The claim that agencies administering the tax credit program 
can weigh the state duty to revitalize against other duties, as the 
court did in In Re 2003, is invalid under the Supremacy Clause of the 
U.S. Constitution.  Federal law is “the supreme Law of the Land; and 
the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the 
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”294  
State courts “are obligated by the Supremacy Clause to protect 
federally guaranteed civil rights as zealously as would a federal 
court.”295  To the extent that there might be any conflict between an 
agency’s mission under state law and its duties under Title VIII, 
reviewing courts should give priority to the Title VIII mandate. 
A state government may not exempt one of its agencies from 
the mandates of federal law simply by defining the agency’s missions 
 
 292. Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209 (1972). The Supreme Court and 
lower appellate courts apply the same canon in other civil rights statutes. See Chisom v. Roemer, 
501 U.S. 380 (1991) (discussing the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and explaining Allen v. State 
Board of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969)); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 315 (1966) 
(same); Henrietta D. v. Bloomberg, 331 F.3d 261 (2d Cir. 2003) (discussing the Americans with 
Disabilities Act). 
 291. Trafficante, 409 U.S. at 211. 
 292. Id. at 212; see Hous. Opportunities Made Equal v. Cincinnati Enquirer, 943 F.2d 644, 
646 (6th Cir. 1991) (holding the FHA to be a remedial statute that should be construed broadly to 
effectuate its purpose). 
 293. See Fair Hous. Advocates Ass’n v. City of Richmond Heights, 209 F.3d 626, 635 (6th Cir. 
2000) (holding that exemptions under the Fair Housing Act should be construed narrowly to 
effectuate the purpose of the statute). 
 294. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 295. Rachel v. State of Georgia, 342 F.2d 336, 342 (5th Cir. 1965), aff’d, 384 U.S. 780 (1966). 
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in a way that conflicts with the requirements of federal law.296  In In 
Re 2003, the Appellate Division erred in holding that the New Jersey 
legislature, in defining the mission of HMFA, either reduced or 
eliminated the Agency’s obligations under Title VIII to administer 
federally funded housing programs in a matter that affirmatively 
furthers the purposes of the FHA. 
In Youakim v. Miller, the Seventh Circuit held that to the 
extent that state law excluded children in the foster care of relatives 
from receipt of funds, the state statutes were contrary to the federal 
Social Security Act (“SSA”) and must be struck down under the 
Supremacy Clause.297  In this case, the plaintiffs challenged the 
Illinois state statutory scheme for the administration of the federally 
funded AFDC-FC program, which provided aid to children in foster 
care, as contrary to the SSA.298  The court expressly rejected the 
state’s claim that the Illinois legislature’s definitions should govern 
the state’s distribution of AFDC-FC funds: “The [state agency] can 
hardly rely upon a definition . . . which directly conflicts with the 
federal statutory definition as a way of upsetting the district court’s 
determination of a violation of the Supremacy Clause.”299 As in 
Youakim, plaintiffs like Fair Share claim that state governments are 
administering a federally funded program in a way that conflicts with 
applicable federal law; the result should be the same. 
3.  The Legislative History and Language of each Statute Supports 
Prioritizing the FHA Duty over the QCT Preference 
The language of the LIHTC statute itself supports prioritizing 
the Title VIII duty.  A plain reading of the statute shows the QCT 
preference applies to already selected projects—that is, projects 
selected subject to the duty to affirmatively further fair housing.  
Many LIHTC projects involve Section 8 voucher tenants and other 
funds allocated by HUD, which are subject to regulations prohibiting 
segregative siting.300  The structure of the LIHTC statute, whatever 
its secondary preferences for QCTs, must wholly accord with the Title 
VIII duty. 
 
 296. Under the Supremacy Clause, “states may not enact laws or regulations which are 
contrary to federal law.” Youakim v. Miller, 562 F.2d 483, 494 (7th Cir. 1977), aff’d 440 U.S. 125 
(1979). 
 297. Id. at 495. 
 298. Id. at 484-86, 494. 
 299. Id. at 488. 
 300. U.S. DEPT. OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., OFFICE OF FAIR HOUS. & EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, 
FAIR HOUSING PLANNING GUIDE, available at http://www.hud.gov/offices/fheo/images/fhpg.pdf. 
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The mandatory language used by Congress in writing the Title 
VIII duty is also stronger than the mere preference of allocation to 
project QCTs, especially when the statute gives apparently equal 
preference to projects serving the poorest tenants and projects lasting 
the longest.301  The QCT statute itself provides little guidance on how 
housing credit agencies should weigh these factors in a qualified 
allocation plan, and the regulations are also silent on the issue.302  A 
federal district court recently discussed the lack of guidance provided 
by the QCT statute, characterizing the language as too “vague and 
amorphous to create judicially enforceable rights under §1983.”303  
Title VIII, however, proclaims loud and clear the requirement to 
affirmatively further fair housing. 
In contrast to the clear intent to create a duty to affirmatively 
further integrated housing choices, as evidenced by the legislative 
debate,304 Congress’s adoption of the qualified census preference was 
enacted without debate or discussion.  It is hard to believe that 
Congress would exempt the single-largest federal source of new 
construction from a very important part of the Fair Housing Act 
without at least some discussion.  If legislative history is considered 
determinative at all in resolving statutory conflicts, the silent 
congressional record in enacting the QCT preference must be read as 
subordinating the preference to the fair housing duty.  This is 
particularly true in light of the congressional intent to end 
government complicity in creating urban ghettos. 
4.  The HUD Siting Regulations Show the Preeminence of the FHA 
Duty 
The HUD siting regulations are not discretionary agency 
interpretations, but restatements of the clear holdings of the federal 
courts interpreting the duty to “affirmatively further fair housing.” 
The requirements for public housing and Section 8 siting were derived 
from Shannon, which itself involved neither program but rather a now 
discontinued HUD subsidy to private developers called section 236.305  
Shannon and its progeny require federal agencies, and state grantees 
of those agencies involved in housing, to use their leverage to support 
 
 301. See 26 U.S.C. § 42 (m)(1)(B)(ii)(I) (2005) (giving equal weight in allocating housing 
credit dollars to tenants’ income and the duration of the project). 
 302. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.42-17(a)(2) (2005) (reserving a section of the Code of Federal 
Regulations for delineating specific criteria). 
 303. DeHarder Inv. Corp. v. Indiana Hous. Fin. Auth., 909 F.Supp. 606, 615 (S.D. Ind. 1995). 
 304. See supra Part III.B. (describing legislative history of duty to affirmatively further). 
 305. See supra Part III.C.1 (examining the background and impact of Shannon). 
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an integrated housing pattern.306  The court applied regulations which 
by their own terms applied to Section 8 and public housing, while the 
housing in Shannon was neither.307  If this basic finding was valid 
regarding the government’s largest low-income housing subsidy in 
1970, it should apply to the government’s largest subsidy for the 
production and rehabilitation of assisted housing today. 
The regulations’ explicit prohibitions reinforce the Title VIII 
duty by severely limiting the siting of public housing in high minority 
and resegregating neighborhoods.  The exception to the minority 
concentration prohibition for areas with “sufficient, comparable 
opportunities”308 does not undermine the priority of integration.  The 
regulation puts the burden of proving that areas in the regional 
market free of discrimination exist on the developer proposing the low 
income site in an area of concentration of the regional housing market.  
Shannon has very strong race-specific language and bans locating new 
low-income housing in racially mixed areas.  In this light, “sufficient 
comparable opportunities” cannot mean the comparable choice to live 
only in other segregated or resegregating neighborhoods; rather it 
must provide the choice to live in white or stably integrated areas.  
Comparable opportunities must mean opportunities comparable to 
whites.  This implies a freedom of choice in the housing market such 
that minority families can choose housing they can afford in 
neighborhoods they desire without fear of steering.  Batteries of 
housing discrimination studies show that pervasive steering, 
discrimination in buying, selling, showing, and mortgage lending are 
present throughout the United States.309  Thus, this exception, 
consistent with the FHA and its command to affirmatively further fair 
housing, will be very difficult to satisfy in virtually all major 
regions.310 
The “overriding need” exception also does not diminish the 
power of the duty to integrate.  The regulation itself states that 
“‘overriding need’ may not serve as the basis for determining that a 
site is acceptable if the only reason the need cannot otherwise feasibly 
be met is that discrimination [makes]. . . sites outside areas of 
 
 306. See supra Part III.C.1 (discussing the effect of Shannon on federal housing grants). 
 307. See Shannon v. HUD, 436 F.2d 809, 821-23 (3d Cir. 1970) (weighing factors applicable 
to Section 8 and public housing when considering the legitimacy of a HUD project). 
 308. 24 C.F.R. § 941.202 (2005). 
 309. See supra Part II.A (listing recent analyses of housing discrimination and resegregation 
affecting federal housing policy). 
 310. Margery Austin Turner et al., Discrimination in Metropolitan Housing Markets, URBAN 
INST., available at http://www.urban.org/url.cfm?ID=410821. 
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minority concentration unavailable.”311  Again, the burden is on the 
proposer of the site to prove that these terms are satisfied.  The 
determination of an overriding need must be made in light of real 
evidence, such as recent HUD-sponsored, but independent, studies.  
These studies showed that many of the most severely ghettoized cities 
are in weak market regions in which the regional market is 
adequately meeting the need for affordable housing.312  To the extent 
the exception is given a less than rigorous regional evaluation, it 
exceeds HUD’s regulatory power as circumscribed by the FHA.  
Although locating more affordable housing in racially segregated 
areas may be permitted under some circumstances, Title VIII’s 
direction to promote integration is not easily overcome.313 
5.  Case Law Affirms Prioritizing the Title VIII Duty 
A federal district court interpreting a similar preference 
statute recently held that the Title VIII duty should be considered 
first.  The court found that the Title VIII duty trumped a federal 
statute allowing a local public housing agency to create local resident 
preference for public housing.314  In reading these two statutes 
together, the court found that the preference applied only after the 
broad duty to affirmatively further fair housing was carried out.  As in 
the case of the QCT preference, the court noted that nothing in the 
statute or legislative history315 shows that Congress intended to 
elevate the preferences of local residents over fair housing concerns: 
If anything the regulation suggests a hierarchy of congressional mandates, with civil 
rights law taking precedence.  Only if they are met are the residency preferences 
permissible.  Indeed to ignore the civil rights impact of residential preferences is to . . . 
give effect to an individual judge’s view that one goal of the statute, concern for local 
needs, is somehow more important than another, concern for fair housing.316 
Following this logic, the preference would be valid in QCTs that are 
part of a concerted community revitalization plan and in 
 
 311. 24 C.F.R. § 941.202 (2005); see supra Part III.B-C. 
 312. See Khadduri, supra note 2, at 9 (referencing residential building statistics for high 
poverty communities). 
 313. The Second Circuit in Otero addressed that issue as follows, noting the duty to integrate 
“is not to be put aside whenever racial minorities are willing to accept segregated housing.” 
Otero v. New York City Hous. Auth., 484 F.2d 1122, 1134-35 (2d Cir. 1973). 
 314. Langlois v. Abington Housing Auth., 234 F.Supp. 2d 33, 67 (D. Mass. 2002). Plaintiff, a 
low income woman of color living outside a predominantly white low poverty area challenged a 
statute which allowed the public housing agency for the white area to create a local resident 
preference. Id  at 37. 
 315. In contrast to the LIHTC, in Langlois there was a legislative record supporting the 
statute allowing local authorities to make preferences. Id. at 68. 
 316. Id. 
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neighborhoods that are not racially segregated or in danger of 
resegregation. 
If the Title VIII duty is predominant and the qualified census 
tract preference is secondary, then the two statutes can be reconciled.  
If a state agency is faced with two projects in non-segregated areas, 
one in a QCT and one not, then the project in the QCT should be given 
preference. 
B.  Recommendations for a Concerted Revitalization Plan Which 
Complies with Title VIII 
The qualified census tract statute specifically mentions 
“community revitalization” twice but does not define it.317  In light of 
the relative lack of guidance on the QCT provision and the lack of a 
statutory or regulatory definition, agencies should use the available 
evidence to determine its meaning.  To give effect to the QCT 
statutory requirement of a “concerted community revitalization plan,” 
while recognizing the supremacy of the FHA, housing agencies must 
adopt a strategy to place credits in only those QCTs that satisfy both.  
As the authors of a recent HUD literature review recently noted, 
however, using housing production subsidies (i.e. tax credits) as a 
revitalization strategy in deeply distressed neighborhoods “will simply 
fail.”318  Accordingly, this Section outlines essential features of a 
concerted revitalization plan which would permit housing agencies to 
place credits in the QCTs where they can succeed while meeting the 
requirements of Title VIII.  Following this argument, the number of 
placements in QCTs would drop, shifting instead to stable or affluent 
areas of the region.  Because the proposed remedy for giving guidance 
to the QCT provision involves race, a brief consideration of the Walker 
opinion, noted above, is warranted.319 
 
 317. See 26 U.S.C. § 42(m)(1)(B)(ii)(III) (2005) (requiring the HMFA to give preference to 
qualified census tracts, so long as the development “contributes to a concerted community 
revitalization plan”); 26 U.S.C. § 42(m)(1)(C)(iii) (2005) (identifying community revitalization as 
one aspect of a project characteristic that must be used as selection criteria); see also supra Part 
VI.A.3 (discussion of the QCT statute’s provision of little guidance for allocating its own 
preferences). 
 318. JILL KHADDURI ET AL., ABT ASSOC., TARGETING HOUSING PRODUCTION SUBSIDIES 90 
(2003). 
 319. See supra notes 182-188 and accompanying text (discussing Walker). 
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1.  A Community Revitalization Plan Should Further Long-term 
Metropolitan Integration 
As discussed above, the legislative history of the FHA and its 
interpretation by courts and regulatory agencies makes clear that 
siting housing in racially concentrated or resegregating areas is 
generally prohibited. These prohibitions should be read as an 
affirmative obligation to support a long-term, sustainable pattern of 
integration.  Sustainable integration requires that the government 
must not only avoid building in segregated neighborhoods but also 
must avoid building in neighborhoods that are in the process of 
resegregation.320  The cycle of segregation and resegregation in 
American cities and suburbs shows that integration must be lasting to 
make it worth the cataclysmic struggles that produced the FHA, its 
subsequent regulations, and fair housing case law. 
Case law interpreting the “affirmatively further” duty provides 
helpful guidelines to prevent resegregation.  Several of the Shannon 
factors relate directly to patterns of resegregation.321  Shannon’s 
emphasis on the racial composition of schools is particularly 
significant.  Sociologists and Congress, through the Kerner 
Commission, know that building low income housing in neighborhoods 
with segregated or resegregating schools will not support stably 
integrated neighborhoods.322  Federal and state agencies should target 
new units in school districts—particularly elementary school areas—
that have the highest and most rapidly growing white enrollment.  
Such targeting is likely to produce the most stable schools and hence 
promote neighborhood integration, as stably integrated schools are an 
indication and an interdependent part of a stably-integrated 
neighborhood.323  Conversely, placing family units in suburbs that are 
already resegregating is likely to leave children in racially and socially 
isolated, opportunity-poor schools within a few years.324 
 
 320. This includes most of the “at-risk suburbs” in the United States. See ORFIELD, supra 
note 46, at 33-42 (describing characteristics of at-risk communities). 
 321. Although many of the factors are concerned with the internal composition of housing 
projects, it is clear that the Shannon court was also concerned with the problem of resegregation. 
See supra Part III.C.1 (examining Shannon’s discussion of resegregation). 
 322. See supra Part II.B (describing studies on the effect of school segregation on residential 
segregation); see also supra Part III.A (summarizing the findings of the Kerner Commission). 
 323. Schools are a consistently reliable indicator of neighborhood health and can predict 
decline and resegregation in a neighborhood. See ORFIELD, supra note 46, at 9-15 (examining the 
relevance of schools in assessing a community’s health). 
 324. The experience of the MTO project clearly shows this is the case as do dozens of 
underinclusive busing plans over a fifty year period. See supra note 43 (discussing how 
integrated housing could prevent forced busing). 
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The Shannon court’s factoring of the location of higher-income 
housing and the effect of zoning restrictions on racial opportunity 
suggests that affluent, stable, residentially restrictive neighborhoods 
and cities should be targets of affordable housing activity.  This 
targeting can produce stable and balanced living patterns while 
requiring exclusive, opportunity-rich suburbs to take on their fair 
share of the regional housing need.  In the United States, the most 
expensive housing markets and most new jobs are created in the 
whitest suburbs, ensuring a high proportion of white residents will 
always remain.325  Aiming tax credits at the places to which people 
with the most residential choices are attracted is a good strategy for 
integration, as it cuts off their avoidance.  Racial fairness must 
ultimately involve constraining the privilege of whites to simply opt 
out. 
2.  A Community Revitalization Plan Should Take into Account 
Opportunity Structures 
A concerted revitalization plan should embody the principles of 
the “opportunity-based housing” approach to community 
development.326  Central to this approach is the insight that residents 
of metropolitan regions are situated within a complex, interconnected 
web of opportunity structures—or lack thereof—that significantly 
shape their quality of life.  Opportunity structures, such as the 
availability of good schools and proximity to good jobs, are the vehicles 
for racial and economic fairness for all residents of a region and are 
tied to metropolitan space; proximity to these structures is strongly 
correlated with an ability to access them.327  Characteristics of school 
population, tax base, growth, jobs, and available land all provide 
relevant data that can be analyzed to provide indicators of community 
health.328  Federal case law and a demographic understanding of 
 
 325. ORFIELD, supra note 46, at 44-46. Clearly a half century of experience shows that while 
high end housing does not ensure stable integration, many of the most successful cities with 
stable integration have been suburbs like Oak Park near Chicago, Shaker Heights outside of 
Cleveland, and Southfield Michigan. See generally W. DENNIS KEATING, THE SUBURBAN RACIAL 
DILEMMA: HOUSING AND NEIGHBORHOODS (1994). 
 326. See john a. powell, Opportunity-Based Housing, 12 J. AFFORDABLE HOUS. & CMTY. DEV. 
188, 188 (2003). powell states creating opportunity-based housing requires the active 
participation of communities of color, who often resist regionalism for fear of being weakened 
politically and culturally. Id. at 203. Metropolitan governments should advise communities of 
color that regional opportunity-based housing strategies do not have to disperse their voice, but 
instead offer them a choice in previously inaccessible housing and job markets. Id. 
 327. Id. at 191. 
 328. See, e.g., ORFIELD, supra note 46, at 31-46 (using cluster analysis of factors to assess city 
and neighborhood health). 
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metropolitan regions and their opportunity structures can further 
provide governments with guidelines for a community revitalization 
program. 
The Gautreaux program provides a definition of what 
revitalization might mean in the context of opportunity structures.329  
The units located in the whitest areas produced significant changes in 
the lives of the movers. In its Moving to Opportunity (“MTO”) and 
HOPE VI  projects, HUD demolished many large central city housing 
projects and attempted to duplicate the success of the Gautreaux 
experience by scattering the residents in less poor areas.  However, 
most often these areas, while less poor than the project areas, were in 
rapidly resegregating places with segregated schools.  In these cases, 
tenants who moved to less segregated areas showed improvement in 
health but not in real economic opportunity; individuals in revitalizing 
areas were not any closer to jobs in the city than they had been before, 
and they remained just as far from (and just as unaware of) new 
suburban jobs as before.330 
The Gautreaux consent decree, however, neglects a key way of 
expanding opportunity.  Although the consent decree’s criteria for 
placements in “revitalizing areas” included many opportunity-related 
factors, including increased development, access to transportation, 
shopping, and nearness to “attractive features,”331 it did not include 
schools.  In light of recent research,332 the Gautreaux factors could 
form a good framework for identifying a revitalizing part of the city, 
but it is unlikely that the neighborhood-based schools would be 
racially and socially integrated.  Magnet schools, drawing children 
from all over the city and the suburbs, could create opportunities for 
neighborhood children in middle income schools that would not be like 
schools that are not segregated by existing housing patterns.  
The non-racial requirements of the HUD siting regulation 
further show the importance of access to fair housing.  Requiring 
comparable services and avoiding low-income neighborhoods 
underscore the importance of race and desegregation.  Studies show 
that poor segregated areas virtually never receive comparable services 
to middle-class areas.333  Moreover, in a fragmented, competitive 
metropolitan area, even in the absence of racism, fiscal competition 
theory suggests that the city must favor certain high tax-paying 
 
 329. Gautreaux v. Landrieu, 523 F.Supp. 665, 669-72 (N.D. Ill. 1981). 
 330. Goering, supra note 90, at 24. 
 331. Gautreaux v. Landrieu, 523 F. Supp. 665, 671 (N.D. Ill. 1981). 
 332. E.g., KHADDURI, supra note 318 and accompanying text. 
 333. ORFIELD, supra note 46, at 23-25, 37-38. 
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citizens who can leave.334  The burden is on those who propose this 
sort of exception to show how to overcome deeply interrelated, 
fundamental problems. 
The HUD regulations also prohibit sites that are detrimental to 
family life or have urban blight, as typified by poor housing stock and 
“other undesirable elements,” unless there is a “concerted program” to 
fix the problem.335  Any “concerted program” that further concentrates 
poor minorities would likely lead landlords to neglect housing 
maintenance, as they typically do in areas of high minority 
concentration.  Poor, segregated neighborhoods are associated with 
high probabilities of teen pregnancy and school violence, and low high 
school graduation rates, none of which are conducive to a high quality 
of family life.336  Health quality in these neighborhoods is much worse 
because of stress, toxins, lack of green spaces, parent working hours, 
and unsafe streets.337  Finally, the opportunity-based approach is 
borne out by the prohibition on siting in areas which require excessive 
travel time to work. Given that the vast majority of new entry-level 
jobs are in developing white suburbs338 with very small amounts of 
affordable housing, this site criterion strongly militates in favor of 
suburban locations. 
At-risk communities and large cities should be placed low on 
state and federal opportunity indices.  They both offer significant 
employment, but fewer educational opportunities because of extremely 
high poverty and segregation rates in their schools.339  Both of these 
types of communities have lower than average tax bases and are 
losing ground against their more affluent suburbs.340  Services, 
because of decreasing fiscal capacity, are also hard to finance.341  New 
housing production subsidies will only have a negative impact on 
already impoverished neighborhoods.342 
 
 334. See James M. Buchanan, Principles of Urban Fiscal Strategy, 11 PUB. CHOICE 1, 13-16 
(1971) (arguing that rational cities will cater to the upper and middle-class in order to attract 
and retain tax-paying citizens). 
 335. 24 C.F.R. § 941.202 (2005). 
 336. See supra Part II.C (noting large disparities in crime and graduation rates between 
segregated and upper-middle class neighborhoods). 
 337. See Goering, supra note 90, at 196-97 (discussing the health effects and stress in MTO 
movers). 
 338. ORFIELD, supra note 46, at 33. 
 339. See id. at 34 (using typology to show differences between suburban and urban areas). 
 340. Id. at 168-69. 
 341. See id. at 30-31 (associating areas with low tax bases with diminished public services). 
 342. See ABT LITERATURE REVIEW, supra note 44, at 47 (arguing for caution in implementing 
new production subsidies in financially depressed neighborhoods). 
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We know from the experience of Gautreaux and the Moving To 
Opportunity demonstrations that movers had the best experiences in 
job-rich, affluent communities.343  These places are less likely to 
experience fiscal inability to handle the needs that poor residents 
have.  Most are presently taxing below average metropolitan rates.344  
Because they have the fiscal resources to provide necessary services, 
they are less likely to experience increasing tax rates that could 
contribute to residential instability.  Residents in job-rich, low-poverty 
communities are much more likely to work, and working residents are 
more likely to be accepted as a viable part of the community.  State 
and federal authorities should place these communities first on their 
opportunity indices. 
3.  A Community Revitalization Plan Must Consider Stably Integrated 
and Gentrifying Neighborhoods 
In addition to preventing resegregation, the allocation of tax 
credits should maintain affordable housing and racial integration in 
neighborhoods of central cities and older suburbs that are 
resegregating in the opposite direction, to all white.  In doing so, state 
and metropolitan governments should be conscious of the harmful 
dynamic that often occurs in such neighborhoods when young white 
professionals and older households without children coexist with poor, 
segregated neighborhood schools.  Shallow subsidies—up to, for 
example, half the cost of a new unit—for maintaining existing housing 
are appropriate to prevent resegregation. Shallow subsidies should 
only be carefully used in market areas where they will provide life 
opportunities and do not contribute to resegregation.  Likewise, 
building new units in areas of weak market demand where existing 
units are habitable and would be abandoned if new ones were built 
should be avoided.  Municipal or regional governments should hold 
land for affordable housing developments in gentrifying areas to later 
use for reinvestment.  If deep subsidies are necessary to preserve 
units, they should be used only in areas where opportunity exists as 
well. 
C.  The Political Consequences of a Tax Credit Policy Consistent with 
 
 343. See Shannon v. HUD, 436 F.2d 809, 822 (1970) (factoring in location of upper and 
middle-class housing); S. Burlington County N.A.A.C.P. v. Mount Laurel, 456 A.2d 390, 440 
(1983) (favoring “[f]ormulas that accord substantial weight to employment opportunities in the 
municipalities, especially new employment accompanied by substantial ratables” (emphasis 
added)). 
 344. ORFIELD, supra note 46, at 33. 
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Title VIII 
 
Although tax credit allocations consistent with the Title VIII 
have the potential to foster and maintain integrated communities and 
schools, they would do so at the expense of most community 
development corporations, which depend on the credits to maintain 
housing in their poor communities.  If this Article’s recommendations 
were adopted, it is likely that the structure of many community 
development corporations would need to change.  The targeting of tax 
credits on affluent areas should shift resources in such a way that 
community development organizations and low-income housing 
providers would be forced to focus on a metropolitan playing field.  
Rather than just “doing deals,” organizations like LISC could use their 
resources and their centrality to the community development 
movement to provide advice to fewer, better-staffed regional 
community development corporations on how to operate on a regional 
playing field. 
The gap left by tax credit funds leaving segregated areas could 
be filled by investment in areas other than housing.  These 
neighborhoods need capital, but they do not need to further 
concentrate poverty or deepen segregation.  A revitalization plan 
should foster multi-racial, mixed-income neighborhoods, with racially 
and socially integrated schools.  Affirmative action programs that 
benefit minority contractors should be preserved and expanded to both 
do this work and to do work in other areas. 
D.  Possible Constitutional Challenges under Walker 
The In Re 2003 court’s suggestion that racial classifications in 
fair housing remedies might be unconstitutional—based largely on the 
Fifth Circuit Walker case345—would likely invalidate the plan 
proposed here, as well as the remedies suggested in Shannon and 
approved in the Supreme Court’s decision in Gautreaux.346  If adopted 
by courts in other jurisdictions, Walker would hinder the 
implementation of the race-conscious remedies best suited to further 
 
 345. Walker v. Mesquite, 169 F.3d 973, 975 (5th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1131 
(2000). 
 346. See Michelle Wilde Anderson, Comment, Colorblind Segregation: Equal Protection as a 
Bar to Neighborhood Integration, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 841, 869 (arguing that review of Walker 
would require reconsidering the central holding of Gautreaux); cf. Thomas Peter Abt, Comment, 
Walker v. City of Mesquite and the Threat to Meaningful Desegregation Remedies, 7 GEO. J. 
POVERTY & POL’Y 123, 143 (2000) (arguing that the Walker court should have applied Gautreaux 
and other precedent to uphold the plan as narrowly tailored). 
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residential integration.  This is particularly true with the tax credit 
program, which specifically involves new construction of subsidized 
housing.  Plans using non-racial preferences, such as siting housing in 
low-poverty areas, would be considerably less effective than those 
acknowledging the importance of race-consciousness.  Using income as 
a proxy for race ignores the devastating impact that resegregation can 
have on neighborhoods.347 
It is not clear, however, that Walker will be duplicated in other 
jurisdictions.  The constitutional validity of selecting neighborhoods 
based on racial composition is arguably less settled than the use of 
quotas in public housing, for example, which are clearly racial 
classifications.348  Tax credit properties can also differ significantly 
from traditional public housing, distinguishing a lawsuit in the 
LIHTC context from the facts of Walker.349  Finally, the decision in 
Walker may also be a reflection of the fact that the Fifth Circuit is 
outside the mainstream—and often in direct conflict with the Supreme 
Court—on issues involving affirmative action and racial 
classifications.350   
 
 VII. CONCLUSION 
In the aftermath of the mixed result in New Jersey, advocates 
will likely continue to press this issue until a court applies a 
consistent interpretation of Title VIII.  In re 2003 clearly illustrates 
the tension between the duty to affirmatively further fair housing and 
the siting preferences in the LIHTC statute.  The court’s finding that 
the duty applies to the tax credit program now requires state agencies 
to keep racial data on the tenants and the placement of LIHTC units.  
The evidence cited above suggests this data will show a racially 
 
 347. See supra Part II.B-C (discussing the resegregation of urban neighborhoods and the 
harm that it has caused). 
 348. See United States v. Starett City Ass’n, 840 F.2d 1096, 1100-01 (2d Cir. 1988) (finding 
that race-based quotas for admission to public housing violated the Fair Housing Act). 
 349. Standing in particular may be a problem. The court found that living near public 
housing was a sufficient injury for standing. See supra note 185. In light of the fact that LIHTC 
units can be mixed-income units where some residents pay market rent, it would be harder for 
homeowners to claim standing based on proximity to a LIHTC unit. 
 350. The Fifth Circuit’s division from mainstream jurisprudence on such issues was recently 
demonstrated when that court’s decision in Hopwood v. Texas, an affirmative action case, was 
overruled by the U.S. Supreme Court in Grutter v. Bollinger. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 
322 (2003) (overruling in part Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (1996)). The Court in Bollinger 
noted a split among the circuits as to whether diversity could be a compelling state interest that 
justifies the use of race in university admissions. Id. It overruled Hopwood, concluding that 
diversity could serve as a compelling state interest. Id. at 325. 
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segregated pattern, which in some instances will be extreme.  Once 
that data is revealed, it may be hard for courts to countenance the 
existing practices. 
Without a policy change, the rolling pattern of suburban 
resegregation caused, in part, by building government-supported low-
income housing in segregated or resegregating neighborhoods will 
continue to deeply hurt hundreds of communities.  These communities 
could be strong and vital if our housing markets were fair and if the 
government affirmatively furthered fair housing.  This disinvestment 
will not only destroy the wealth building of middle-class black and 
Latino households, but will reinforce the white prejudice that creates 
this pattern in the first place.  Crucial to the goals of ending racial 
bias and supporting racial opportunity is the knowledge that we can 
know and understand those of another race who today live in two 
different worlds and experience two very different Americas. 
The Civil Rights Act of 1968, which includes Title VIII, is one 
of the most hallowed accomplishments of American law and shows 
Congress’s clear objective to integrate American society.  Yet as 
history has shown, without persistent advocacy, even the clearest 
legislative pronouncements will not enforce themselves.  Advocates 
need to pursue other remedies to further an integrated society.  This 
involves using the federal FHA and state statutes and constitutions, 
together with a coherent multi-front legislative strategy.  This 
strategy must involve long-term metropolitan integration, principles 
of opportunity-based housing, and the stabilization of integrated and 
gentrifying neighborhoods.  Housing must be viewed as a clear path 
toward racial and economic opportunity that holds a real hope for 
revitalizing cities and older suburbs. 
